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This study undertakes a comparative analysis of the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flowing from the multinational corporations (MNCs) into China and India over the 
period 1992 to 2001. On the whole, the yawning gap between China and India in 
attracting the non-debt creating FDI flows raises some important fundamental questions 
about its actual FDI potentials. What could be the possible reasons behind China’s 
success in attracting FDI inflows? Has the Chinese FDI been said to take place at least 
partially, at India’s expense? Can India possibly become an FDI destination as attractive 
as China? Who are the target groups of foreign investors for India? What lessons can 
India possibly derive from China to attract these investors? An effort is made in this 
study to answer these questions. We attempt to explore the patterns of FDI inflows by the 
MNCs into these two countries and analyze their differences. We also examine the 
prevailing investment climate to account for these differences and finally suggest 
possible lessons for India.  
 
The study mainly focuses on areas where it is possible for India to attract larger 
FDI inflows provided appropriate specific and generic MNC-friendly policies are put in 
place. These are the retail-trade sector, export-oriented manufacturing, the creation of 
sufficient number of Special Economic Zones of quality and the proactive role of the 
state governments in aiding the FDI process in conjunction with the Central government 
and the private sector. On the basis of an extensive examination of the Indian and 
Chinese data, the paper concludes that India falls short of China in all these respects. This 
study recommends the Indian government to redesign its policies in each of these 
directions. Some of the other recommendations include, desirable infrastructure facilities, 
relaxation of small-scale industry regulations, lower commodity and utility prices, lower 
indirect taxes, lower import duties on raw materials, fiscal and other fillips to encourage 
some specific types of investment, incentives for new business promotion, harmonization 
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The official statistics of foreign direct investment (FDI)1 inflows in China and 
India exhibits a remarkable discrepancy that consequently establishes the unmatched 
superiority of China in attracting FDI inflows. China ventured into the path of 
liberalization in 1979 by gradually liberalizing and opening up its economy2. Removal of 
restrictions on inward FDI has figured out to be one of the prominent features in the 
Chinese reforms. China has indeed achieved remarkable success in FDI since it formally 
opened its door to FDI with the passage of the “Law of People’s Republic of China on 
Joint Ventures using Chinese and Foreign Investment” in 1979. By virtually having their 
non-state sector (counterpart of India’s private sector) run on free market principles and 
setting up large special economic zones, encouraging competition among Chinese 
provinces to attract FDI, offering substantial tax concessions, permitting the leasing of 
land and property, introducing government guarantees for investment and special 
arrangements regarding retention and repatriation of foreign exchange, China has been 
able to attract significant sums of FDI inflows (Bajpai and Jian, 1996; Bajpai, Jian and 
                                                          
1 Simply speaking, FDI can be defined as a financial stake a foreign company acquires in a domestic 
company. FDI is the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in 
one economy (“direct investor” or parent enterprise) obtaining a ‘lasting interest’ and control in an 
enterprise resident in another economy (“direct investment enterprise”) (International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, Fifth Edition, 1993). The two criteria incorporated in the notion of 
“lasting interest” are the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise 
and, the significant degree of influence that gives the direct investor an effective voice in the management 
of the enterprise. An equity capital stake of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power in an 
incorporated enterprise, or its equivalent in an unincorporated enterprise, is normally considered as a 
threshold for the control. If a shareholding of 10 percent or more is acquired eventually by a non-resident 
who entered initially through the portfolio route but holds investment aggregating over 10 percent through 
the purchase of additional shares in subsequent transactions, those additional shares should be regarded as a 
part of FDI. 
 
2 Huang (2002) has classified the FDI regime in China into four distinct phases:  
1979-1985 – Permitting FDI 
1986-1991 – Selectively encouraging FDI 
1992-1996 – Substantial FDI liberalization 
1997-2000 – Streamlining FDI approvals and World Trade organization (WTO) agreement. 
 
 4
Sachs, 1997). This has made possible the acceleration of transfer of technology and 
modern management skills as well as providing foreign exchange (Chunlai, 1997).  
 
China's huge market size with its 1.3 billion consumers, liberalized FDI 
regulations and improvement of infrastructure and its abundant supply of cheap labor are 
attractive to foreign firms (Zhang, 2001). While FDI in 1980 was virtually minimal 
(about 596 million)3, within a span of 21 years, China’s annual FDI inflows are way over 
$40 billion. As is evident from Table 1, in 2001 China attracted $46.8 billion in FDI, a 
14.9 percent increase over 2000, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). Low wages and low labor costs, membership in the World 
Trade Organization and a rapidly developing domestic consumer market add up to make 
China a "highly favored" destination for FDI.  This foreign investment was distributed 
over manufacturing, retailing (chain stores) and real estate (apartment buildings) rose 13 
percent to $52.7 billion according to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation. The large amount of FDI helped China surpass the Unites States as the 
world’s top recipient of FDI. Rising foreign investment is helping China to grow at the 
fastest pace among the world’s top 10 economies. In 2002, China’s growth accelerated to 
8 percent from 7.3 percent in 20014. 
 
India, the only developing country of size and diversity of industrial base 
comparable to China, has also adopted a similar path of liberalization since 1991, by 
slowly shedding its FDI restrictions and allowing FDI through automatic route barring a 
few strategic industries of security concern (Dasgupta 1999). It is important to note that 
in 1997, India had joined the band of the top ten developing country recipients of FDI 
flows, whereas China had already acquired prominent positions at least since 1991 
(World Bank, 1998).  
 
The government of India is actively pursuing a more open door policy for foreign 
investment to enhance the potential for India to become an attractive FDI destination 
(EPW, 2000). For example, the Indian government has decided to allow 100 percent 
foreign equity in crude oil refining and in e-commerce. In power projects most 
restrictions have been removed and 100 percent equity participation has been made 
permissible. The requirement that foreign companies in 22 consumer goods industries 
had to bring in, within a specified period, foreign exchange through exports to balance 
their foreign exchange remittances on account of dividends has been done away with 
(EPWa, 2000). The government of India formed the N.K. Singh Committee on FDI in 
2002 (Government of India, 2002) that has made some major recommendations for 
raising sectoral caps on infrastructure industry and other areas including financial 
services and real estate for attracting $8 billion by way of FDI in the Tenth Plan (See 
Annexure 1). 
 
                                                          
3 Chen, C., Chang, L. & Zhang, Y (1995), “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Post-1978 




The FDI inflow has marginally increased to $3.9 billion in 2001-02. Total FDI 
inflows in India during 2002 were $4.43 billion, including American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs)/ Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) and advance pending issue of shares. FDI 
inflows net of ADRs/GDRs during 2002 were 8.45 percent higher in rupee terms 
compared to 2001. 
 
As a part of the ongoing effort to make FDI estimation compliant with the IMF 
norms, the FDI figure in India, net of American Depository receipts (ADRs) /Global 
Depository Receipts (GDRs) has risen from about $3.9 billion in 2001-02 to $5.4 billion 
in 2002-03. This is a spurt of about 40 percent indicating a substantial difference in the 
country's official FDI figures5 but still significantly low in comparison to China. Actual 
FDI inflows from 1991 (when the economic reforms were initiated) till February 2003, 
amounted to $32.9 billion against total approvals of $76.6 billion through government 
and Reserve Bank of India routes6.  
 
Reliance of an economy on FDI can be illustrated through several indices. For 
example, FDI dependency can be exhibited in terms of the absorption of the cumulative 
total of FDI over some period. Table 1 provides a synoptic comparative view of FDI 
inflows in China and India over 1992 to 2001. Indian FDI stands low as compared to 
China in terms of the accumulated FDI over this time span. While the cumulative FDI 
that India has received in a decade of liberalization (1992-2001) is a total of $20.49 
billion, the corresponding figure for China is $364.26 billion, nearly 18 times higher than 
that of India. The annual FDI inflows of over $46 billions of China compared with a 
trivial amount of $3.4 billion (7.26 percent of Chinese FDI inflow) into India in 20017. 
China alone attracted over a quarter of total FDI inflows to the developing nations over 
the decade, thus serving as both an attractive local market and also as an export platform 
for multinationals. The corresponding figure for India was a mere 1.2 percent.  
 
Apart from the absolute size of FDI, we could also inspect the FDI inflows 
relative to the size of the economy. The share of FDI inflows in GDP has been also very 
small for India compared to China. Table 2 gives a picture of FDI as a percentage of GDP 
for India and China for some selected years over 1997 through 2001. The FDI-GDP ratio 
                                                          
5 The enhancement of the FDI data is due to incorporation of more items like earnings reinvested by the 
MNCs operating in India and intra-corporate debt transactions. Data on reinvested earnings with regard to 
3,000 major companies have been included in FDI figures for `02-03. A process to collect the data from a 
total of over 10,000 companies is on, while this has not been accounted in the 02-03 figures. The areas that 
still need to be explored for FDI calculations are investment by MNCs for establishment of branch offices, 
and money flowing to a subsidiary from its parent corporation as grants.  
Source: The Economic Times, 2nd May, 2003. 
 
6 The Financial Express, 7th June, 2003. 
 
7 However, it appears that the gap between these two estimates may be exaggerated owing to technical 
issues in measurement. Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is presently evaluating some modifications in the way 
that Indian FDI is measured, which could yield somewhat higher estimates for India. This issue is discussed 
in Bajpai and Dasgupta (2003). 
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for India is not only very low in comparison to China, it is very small in absolute terms, 
remaining less than one over the selected periods. On the whole, the yawning gap 
between China and India in attracting the non-debt creating FDI flows has indeed been a 
matter of significant policy concern for India, because in the process India has lost and 
continues to loose a lot of markets and a lot of FDI to China. 
 
By China's high standards, the financial stake of a foreign company in a Chinese 
concern must be at least 25 percent to qualify as FDI. Even by these standards, China 
attracts enormous amounts of FDI. UNCTAD’s ranking of countries based on FDI 
relative to the size of the economy was 121 for India and 61 for China for the period 1988 
to 1990. The corresponding figures for 1998-2000 are 119 and 47 respectively. While 
India has improved marginally, China reveals a huge success in terms of FDI ranking 
(Nagaraj, 2003). In 2002, the A.T. Kearney survey also found that China outranked the 
U.S. as the most attractive destination for FDI. The importance of FDI to China is readily 
apparent. 
 
These discrepancies in the relative FDI attracting capabilities of India and China 
raise some important fundamental questions about the actual FDI potential of India. Can 
India possibly become an FDI destination as attractive as China? Who are the target 
groups of foreign investors that are likely to invest in India? What lessons can India 
possibly derive from China to attract these investors? 
 
1.2 Objective of the Paper 
 
The existing FDI-gap between India and China in terms of the constituent 
elements of FDI has been explored in Bajpai and Dasgupta (2003). The paper raised an 
important point that is usually overlooked in comparing the Indian and Chinese FDI, that 
is, the expatriate investment is a very small portion of aggregate FDI in India and the 
expatriate Indians do not form a large segment of the target investors in India, unlike in 
China.  
 
A substantial portion of the FDI to China comes from overseas Chinese living in 
an arc of Pacific Rim, especially in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Macao. This 
Chinese diaspora pioneered export-led growth with labor-intensive manufacture (e.g. 
toys, wigs and textile assembly lines) in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and, once 
wages there rose sharply, they re-located these manufacturing operations to mainland 
China8 when the economy was opening up in the 1980s taking with it the huge volumes 
                                                          
8 Chinese government, through a decree passed on 18th August 1990, provides for special rules and 
regulations to encourage investments by overseas Chinese. The government has thus pursued an active 
policy to attract investments by the Non-resident Chinese (NRCs). This shows that China has maintained 
its links with the Chinese abroad, both culturally and economically.  




of FDI that the country is now known for. This possibly explains, at least partially the 
present Chinese export machinery centering on the manufacture and shipping of light 
manufactured goods. 
 
The Chinese official statistical database does not provide disaggregated FDI 
statistics that would directly project the relative contribution by the Non-Resident 
Chinese (NRC) population in China. However, based on the fact that a large proportion 
of NRCs residing in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Macao make FDI to mainland 
China, we will make the assumption that, in broad terms, -- any FDI originating from 
these countries will constitute expatriate FDI and mainland Chinese funds routed through 
local financial agents - round tripping. While it is very likely that the entire FDI from 
these economies to China may not be totally from the NRCs, but a very large part of it 
actually is. Given that we’re simply trying, in broad terms, to segregate FDI by NRCs and 
the multinational corporations9 (MNCs), this procedure will enable us to get at least a 
rough idea of the amount of FDI by the MNCs in China. Accordingly, we have computed 
the FDI contribution of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Macao to mainland China 
over 1992 to 2001 in Table 3. It is evident that the share of OECD countries and with it 
the share of MNCs in Chinese FDI inflows has been rising over the 1990s while the share 
of Singapore, Macao, Taiwan and Hong Kong (supposedly the NRC contribution) is 
falling. NRC contribution, which was nearly 80.5 percent of the total Chinese inflows in 
1992, has gradually decreased over the 1990s, being on an average about 60.5 percent10 
over the decade. But nonetheless, even in 2001, more than 47 percent of FDI inflows to 
China came from these four countries11.  
                                                          
9 An MNC is an enterprise that engages in FDI and that owns or controls value-added activities in more 
than one country. 
 
11There is a controversy among economists regarding the volume of expatriate contribution derived from 
Singapore. They opine that unlike Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, FDI from Singapore cannot be claimed 
to be from expatriate sources because of the substantial MNC activity in Singapore. That is why, we have 
also calculated the percentage contribution of NRCs to the Chinese FDI excluding Singapore in Table 3. It 
is interesting to note that while the percentage contribution to FDI excluding Singapore in 1992 was 
slightly lower (79.37) than that including it, this figure showed significant difference over the decade and in 
2001, it was 42.7%, that is much lower than the FDI contribution including Singapore. This implies, one 
that Singapore’s contribution to Chinese FDI inflows increased over the decade and two, there is a need for 
undertaking a separate study for exploring the actual ratio of expatriate and MNC contribution to Chinese 
FDI inflows from Singapore.  We intend to do that in subsequent research. Right now, we will assume that 
the contribution to FDI from Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore and Taiwan is an index of NRC participation 
in Chinese FDI inflows.  
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As a stark contrast to the Chinese experience, the Indian diaspora did not follow 
the similar route. This explains their very low investment in India (Guha and Ray, 2002; 
Bajpai and Dasgupta, 2002). The official statistics on FDI data in India clearly identifies 
the dichotomy in the source of FDI inflows in terms of expatriate and non-expatriate 
route that can be assumed to reflect the MNC contribution to the FDI inflows. This can 
be seen in Table 412.  
 
Table 4 reflects the diversity in the sources of FDI data in India over 1991-92 to 
2001-02. The actual total FDI in India is composed of those sanctioned by RBI’s 
automatic approval route for equity holding up to 51 percent, those through the 
discretionary approval route of the Secretariat for Industrial Assistance (SIA)/Foreign 
Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) for larger projects with equity holding greater than 
51 percent, NRI investments and also the acquisition of shares (since 1996). It is evident 
from the table that over the ten years following liberalization, FDI inflows from NRI 
sources was on an average, around 13.8 percent as compared to an average of nearly 78 
percent from non-NRI sources. Thus, expatriate investment has been a very small portion 
of aggregate FDI in India, in spite of gradual attempts by the government to simplify the 
regulations involving investments by the non-resident Indians13 (NRIs) into the country 
and hence the expatriate Indians do not form a large segment of the target investors in 
India, unlike in China. The proportion of FDI into India flowing from the non-NRI 
sources has been on an average, steadily rising since 1992, reaching 97 percent in 2001. 
Also, on an average, FDI inflows into India from non-NRI sources have been around 5.8 
times that from NRI sources. This figure is an indication of the growing interest of MNCs 
in India.  
 
There exist differences in underlying motives for making FDI between the MNCs 
and the diaspora of the respective countries, although the differences might be fine at 
times. While the primary motive of the non-resident investors is profit maximization like 
any other rational investor, including the MNCs, yet there are some distinct factors 
playing a role in the selection of their respective home-countries as the venue of their 
investment. This could be the familiarity with the language, culture, socio-economic and 
political conditions of the country, pre-determined social and economic networking 
through relations and could even be the nationalistic spirit prevailing in them14. These 
                                                          
12 The Government of India also provides another account of FDI inflows in its annual publication of 
Economic Survey. The difference between this account and the one provided by the RBI is that the 
Economic Survey classifies ADR/GDR inflows as FDI while the RBI account records them under foreign 
portfolio investment.  
13 Nonresident Indians are defined as those who possess an Indian passport or whose father or paternal 
grandfather was a citizen of India. 
 
14 Thus, while there may be several reasons for the non-resident Chinese (NRCs) to invest in China, 
expatriate characteristics surely would be playing a significant role. However, the expatriate Chinese have a 
theoretical choice of choosing contract production but they do not; instead they do FDI. Since China’s 
financial market isn’t that developed and China lacks proper legal institutions, it can be imagined that the 
NRCs would be better off making FDI rather than doing contractual production. In the case of FDI, since 
the Chinese government encourages it very much, they have made the rules and procedures for making FDI 
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factors together with the standard FDI incentives such as market size, factor cost, 
infrastructure and institutional endowments determine expatriate FDI into the host 
country. On the other hand, the MNCs would like to take care of the fundamentals of the 
host countries comprising the economic, legal and institutional factors that generate the 
FDI climate for choosing their FDI locations. From this point of view, the real FDI-
attracting potential of India and China can best be understood if we consider only the 
flow of MNC investments in the two countries. 
 
In view of these asymmetries between the constituents of FDI between China and 
India, a comparison of the overall FDI figures inclusive of the expatriate component may 
fail to provide a meaningful comparison of FDI between India and China. There is thus a 
need to disaggregate the FDI statistics between MNC contribution and expatriate 
participation figures that could produce a more focused and meaningful study of foreign 
interest in making FDI in the two countries. Also, the sectoral distribution of FDI by the 
MNCs would give us an insight of the areas preferred by the foreign firms for investment 
in the respective countries.  
 
Moreover, it logically transpires from the above analysis that the FDI investors in 
India are predominantly the foreign firms, especially the MNCs. Therefore, to compete 
with China and other countries in attracting FDI inflows, measures need to be taken to 
attract increased volume of FDI inflows from the MNCs into India. China, in spite of its 
socialistic philosophy had opened up to MNC investment long before India, presumably 
with a view to securing technological expertise for ultimately starting up sophisticated 
hardware industries of its own (Raj 1985).  Until 1991, India relied more on bilateral and 
multilateral loan agreements with long maturities, and relatively lesser on FDI. FDI was 
allowed only in designated industries with varying conditionalities imposed upon them 
regarding the scope and extent of domestic participation in the joint venture agreements 
such as local content requirements, export obligations, local R & D promotion, etc.  
 
This study makes a comparative analysis of FDI flowing only from the MNCs 
into India and China over the period 1992 to 2001. Precisely, this research has both the 
positive and normative dimensions. Under the first, this paper explores the patterns of 
FDI inflows by the MNCs into the two countries and analyzes the differences. Within the 
normative view, it examines the prevailing investment climates to account for these 
differences and finally to seek possible lessons for India. India can attract FDI from the 
MNCs by creating for itself a conducive investment climate (Bajpai and Sachs, 2000). 
Perhaps, then, India can possibly withstand Chinese competition in the market for FDI 
inflows and achieve the benefits that FDI inflows bring in. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 traces out certain major 
characteristics of the volume and sectoral allocation of FDI by the MNCs in India in 
comparison to that in China and highlights the differences. Section 3 probes into some of 
the possible explanations behind the differences. This includes some of the 
recommendations as to whether India needs to implement any major policy reforms 
                                                                                                                                                                             
easy and simple. Whereas in contractual production, proper procedures, legal back-up in case there are 
disputes are necessary. 
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(overall institutional or sector specific). On the basis of the above analysis, Section 4 
reviews the investment climate scenario of India and points out to the possible lessons 
that the Indian firms and the government could learn from their Chinese counterparts to 
increase India’s FDI-attractiveness for the MNCs vis-à-vis China. 
 
 
2. FDI by the MNCs in India and China – The Quantitative Dimensions and the 
Sectoral Allocation Pattern 
 
2.1 Volume of FDI inflows by the MNCs in India and China  
 
India and China, accounting for around 40 percent of the world's population have 
been attracting the MNCs by their market size and diversity of economy. MNC 
participation in FDI in India is an old phenomenon that got largely waned out with the 
Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade practices Act (MRTP) Act and Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act (FERA) in the 1970s. However, since liberalization, with the repealing of 
MRTP and delicensing, more and more MNCs are operating in the Indian economy (see 
Table 5). Some of them have been attracted to make FDI in India with the opening up of 
the economy. Many others were already present with minority shareholdings in the joint 
ventures. A large number of these companies have increased their holdings to 51 percent 
or more with the liberalization (Dasgupta, 1999). However, MNC participation in Indian 
FDI stands remarkably low as compared to China. This is evident from the fact that the 
multinationals from the Western world as well as Japan and some Asian countries have 
poured in more than $300 billion15 into China over the 1990s as compared to around $15 
billion into India16.  
 
For more than two decades, foreign capital invested by the MNCs have 
accelerated the development of China’s manufacturing industry. Endowed with the 
world's largest population, China has virtually become the focal point of global 
corporations who seek cheap labor as well as the potential of reaching the world's largest 
market of consumers in an environment of policy preferences given by Chinese 
government to induce FDI inflows17. In 2002, China surpassed the United States for the 
                                                          
15 This figure is obtained in Table 3, by adding FDI inflows to China over 1992 to 2001 from Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Virgin Islands, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Australia and Canada. 
 
16 This figure is obtained in Table 4, by subtracting NRI contribution from the total official FDI inflows to 
India over the 1990s. 
 
17 Most of the Top 500 MNCs in the world have been investing in China in recent years. For instance, the 
foreign share in the market of facsimile and video camera reaches 98% and 99% respectively, while the 
mobile phone 80%, the computer 75%, the car 70%, and the digital program controlled switch 50%. Now 
there are 8 large enterprises producing large-sealed integrated circuit in the micro-electricity industry in 
China, 5 of which are Sino-foreign joint venture, and one of which is exclusively invested by foreign 
capital. among the 5 enterprises jointly owned, only one is dominated by Chinese enterprise while 4 are 
dominated by foreign enterprises. In the engineering mechanics industry, there are 126 joint ventures, 36% 
of which are dominated by foreigners, while 47% of which are dominated by Chinese enterprises, and 17% 
of which are equally owned.  
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first time as the world's largest foreign investment receiver, with an inflow of foreign 
capital to the tune of US$52.7 billion. And the mainland continues to be the favored 
destination of global corporations in 2003 as well, attracting US$7.54 billion in the first 
two months of 2003 that rose from US$5.88 billion in the first two months of 2002 thus 
indicating an increase of 28 percent for the same period this year. Contracted foreign 
investment, a sign of future investment, increased to US$14.2 billion over the same 
period in 200318.  
 
While foreign investments into China have mainly been from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, MNCs from the developed nations have, of late, emerged as significant 
investors. Even such Latin American countries as Cayman Islands have become key 
pushers of FDI into China. In 2001, 23 percent of the increase in FDI was by Japanese 
investors alone (Majumder, 2003).  
 
We have mentioned in the above section that no direct comparison of MNC 
versus non-resident contribution to FDI inflows between India and China is possible 
because of lack of a similar database in China that categorically shows the FDI inflows 
coming from the expatriate sources as distinct from those coming from non-expatriate 
sources. As such,  we have chosen to address this issue in an alternative way. We have 
selected a number of source countries from across the continents (excluding, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) that make significant FDI in both China and India and 
we have compared their respective FDI contribution in the two countries. These fourteen 
countries are Japan, Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Virgin Islands, United Kingdom, 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
States, Australia and Canada. Tables 6 and 7 show the country-wise FDI inflow in China 
and India19 respectively.  
 
 Table 8, computed on the basis of the previous two tables reflects a number of 
facts. First, while the FDI contribution of the aforesaid countries to China during the 
1990s was only around 15 percent, that to India was nearly 67 percent. This is an 
indicator of the greater MNC participation in the FDI inflows of India as compared to 
China. This corroborates our finding in the last row of Table 4 where on the basis of  
1991-2001 FDI data, we show that the participation of MNCs in the Indian FDI inflows 
over this period was around 77 percent20.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Yifang, N., Wen, G & Xiaobo, W, (2002) “The Opportunities, Threats and Counter-measures of China’s 
Manufacturing Industry Under the Globalization”, School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, 
China. 
 
18 Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) website: www.moftec.gov.cn 
19 Although substantial FDI inflows have taken place from Singapore to India over 1992-2000 ($1858.91 
million) and such FDI is rightfully of the MNC variety, yet to maintain parity with the Chinese scenario we 
have not included it in the MNC contribution to FDI inflows in India.   
 
20 The figures do not match exactly because of differences in the data sources. However the largeness of the 
two figures indicate a similarity of the results and hence it may be concluded that MNC participation in 
Indian FDI inflows over the 1990s has been substantial. 
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Thus, while in terms of percentages to total FDI inflows, country-wise FDI to 
India exceeds China, yet the individual contribution of these countries to China is much 
higher than that flowing to India. Looking at the China-India ratio of FDI inflows 
according to source countries (the last column of Table 8), we find that the FDI inflow to 
India exceeds China only from Mauritius. The special role of Mauritius here is likely to 
be the consequence of the special tax treatment accorded in India to investments routed 
through Mauritius. On an aggregate, FDI inflows to China from the stated source 
countries are more than three times that to India. 
 
 It is to be noted that Chinese FDI data till 1996 comprised ‘other’ investment 
elements as well. These ‘other’ elements include value of equipment supplied by foreign 
businesses in transactions of compensation trade, processing and assembly and value of 
equipment supplied in financial leasing transactions. Thus, there is no direct 
comparability of FDI statistics between China and India till 1996. Moreover, country-
wise FDI data for China shows the actual utilization data while the Indian counterpart is 
available only for the approval statistics. In spite of these differences we have no option 
but to study the available data in the absence of alternative comparable FDI statistics for 
India and China. The year-wise approved FDI for India is visibly much less than the 
actually used FDI in China. Given the wide discrepancy between annual actual and 
approved FDI in India as disclosed by official reports, one can just imagine the actual 
FDI that really gets into India from these foreign countries. Thus, the actual MNC 
participation to FDI in India is much lower as compared to that in China.  
 
We have ranked the fourteen countries making MNC investment in China and 
India respectively in Table 8. In terms of the country-wise breakup of FDI inflows, the 
most important FDI-making countries to India are U.S. (23.8 percent), followed by 
Mauritius (10.2 percent), and U.K. (7.5 percent). The corresponding figures for China are 
U.S. (rank 1 with 3.8 percent) followed by Japan (3.5 percent) and the Virgin Islands (1.8 
percent).  
 
The simple correlation coefficient between the ranks comes out to be around 0.28. 
This means that there is very little consistency among the relevant ranks of the two 
countries in terms of source country FDI. While U.S. is the forerunner in FDI in both 
India and China -- France, Netherlands and Sweden take the eighth, ninth and fourteenth 
positions in both the host countries. There is lack of consistency in the ranks among the 
other ten countries, of which some amount of similarity in ranks has been observed for 
Korea, Germany and Switzerland. Extreme differences are found for Mauritius and 
Virgin Islands, which have been alleged for round-tripping of FDI in India and China 
respectively.  
 
Table 9 represents the trend of FDI in developing countries on an approval basis. 
Overall, there has been a downward trend in FDI approval in all the countries cited in the 
table from 2000 to 2002, presumably due to the global recession over this period. The 
major recipients of FDI in the ASEAN are Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. In 2002 
though, FDI into both Indonesia and Malaysia plunged by 35-40 percent. But what is 
striking is that FDI approvals in India fell to $2.3 billion in 2002, the lowest since 1993. 
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The fall was despite the country being one of the few which sustained its GDP growth 
amidst the global recession, thus contradicting the economic logic that a country with 
higher GDP growth should attract more FDI. This fall in FDI in 2002, can be attributed to 
the slow down in the inflows into the telecommunications and software sectors — in the 
former to $235.2 million from $2,059 million in 2001 and in the latter to $145.9 million 
from $323.2 million.  
 
 Paradoxically, though, actual investment by foreign investors in India stayed 
afloat in 2002, increasing to $4.4 billion from the $4.3 billion recorded in 2001. While a 
decline in FDI approvals mirrors a slump in foreign investors' urge for fresh investments, 
the surge in actual investments could mean that foreign investors, already doing business 
in India, were bullish. In other words, the foreign investors who had obtained approvals 
before this period continued to be positive about implementing their projects.  
 
In China, on the other hand, better GDP growth has become the plank for FDI 
surge, with investments rising to $48 billion in the 11 months of 2002 — a 15 percent 
jump over the corresponding period of 2001. Certain questions emerge at this juncture. 
Why then did fresh FDI shy away from India in 2002? Did China’s FDI growth take 
place at India’s expense? To seek answers to these questions we need to explore the 
sectoral allocation of India’s FDI. 
 
2.2 Sectoral Allocation of FDI 
 
Increasing number of MNCs, including Fortune 500 companies across the 
spectrum of banking and financial services, manufacturing, information technology, 
power, telecommunications and services have been opening up offices in the major 
Indian metropolitan cities since 1997, entering joint ventures with Indian partners, or 
starting wholly owned subsidiaries. The presence of so many global giants, including 
companies from United States, Great Britain, Korea and Japan, indicates the perception 
that it is important to be present in the Indian market.  
 
Table 10 describes the sectoral distribution of FDI in India over 1992 to 2002 as 
obtained from RBI data. As is evident from Table 10, electrical, engineering and 
electronic goods accounted for the major share of FDI flow into India between 1992 and 
2002. In 1999-00, these three sectors accounted for a major 32 percent of the total actual 
FDI flows. FDI was rarely available for infrastructure projects. None of the infrastructure 
sectors figured in the first 10 major sectors that attracted FDI flows during 1999-00. FDI 
in the computers and service sectors gained momentum towards the end of the 1990s. 
FDI in the chemicals, finance, food and dairy products and the pharmaceutical sector 
have shown a remarkable decline since the mid-1990s. FDI in engineering industries 
displayed a downward trend, but still could retain an 8 percent share in 2001-02. The 
service sector attracted the most FDI in 2002 (38 percent of the total FDI, leaving 61 
percent for the manufacturing sector). On the whole, it transpires from the table that 
while FDI in the service sector showed a rising trend, in the manufacturing sector, only 
electronics and computers could attract significant FDI during 2000-02. On the whole, it 
is observed that in India, FDI is flowing into areas where skilled labor is a major input.  
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The SIA data on sectoral allocation of FDI states the approval values although the 
ranking of FDI inflows are slightly different for the SIA data as compared to the RBI 
data. One reason could be that the time span varies slightly in the two data sets. 
Moreover, the sectors not stated explicitly in the RBI data may have been included in the 
category “others”.  In terms of the industries where FDI has come into India, Table 11 
shows that the most important sectors are telecom, electrical equipment, including 
computer software, energy, and the transportation industry21. These four sectors 
accounted for roughly 50 percent of FDI inflows. So far as approval is concerned, 
electrical equipment including computer software, energy (power and oil refineries) and 
electronics are the sectors that have attracted highest FDI approval indicating the 
priorities of development and growth of these sectors in the government. These 4 sectors 
have also received highest approval technology transfer (Table 12). Inflows as a 
percentage of approvals were highest in chemicals (excluding fertilizers), followed by 
transportation, electrical equipment and services22. This in turn shows the relative 
attractiveness of the different sectors in India to the foreign companies.  
 
Thus, there seems to be a mismatch between the areas where Indian government 
has been inviting FDI (visible from the approval data) and the sectors which could in 
reality attract the foreign investors, except for electronic equipment, which too did not 
quite match in ranking.  As mentioned earlier, the inflows into the telecommunications 
and software sectors in India slowed down in 2001. In 2002, fresh initiative in the 
telecom sector ebbed because of the completion of bidding for the telecom circles, and 
computer software lost its glamour post-9/1123. Also, in information technology (IT), 
foreign investments flowed mainly through the money market (euro issues) and not via 
foreign companies. During 2000 and 2001, over 40 percent of the total FDI approved in 
the country was through euro issues. But in 2002, the share of euro issues declined to 0.7 
percent, due mainly to the slump in computer software industry (Majumder, 2003).  
 
It is evident from Table 13 that FDI in manufacturing has maintained the lead 
position since 1999, the different categories of which are not explicit from the data 
                                                          
21 In the 1990s, with software and telecom fever gripping India, FDI flows were largely into these two 
sectors. 
 
22 FDI in India is gradually entering into the finance and service sectors and will be continuing to do so 
with the emerging trend of US companies outsourcing their routine services to India. 
 
23 It has been revealed in the FDI Confidence Index, 2002 by A.T. Kearney, that telecom and utilities 
investors consider India as their 25th most attractive investment destination. This is probably stimulated by 
new policies and regulations, including allowing telecom service providers to carry forward losses and 
unabsorbed depreciation, measures that facilitated the merger of Birla Tata AT&T and BPL 
Communications in June 2002. 
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source. It can be presumed that manufacturing includes all low technology as well as 
technology-intensive production sectors. Real estate has been upgraded from a fifth 
position in 1999 to a second rank in 2000. The FDI inflows in electric power, gas and 
water supply has been gradually deteriorating from 1999.  
 
Although infrastructure (electric power, gas, water supply, transport, storage, post 
& telecom services) has attracted FDI in China as in India; in this way there is similarity 
between the sectoral FDI between the two countries. But remarkable difference exists in 
the expanse of the areas of foreign investments in India and China. FDI in China is rather 
extensive, being diffused over agriculture (farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery), mining, manufacturing and significantly into the tertiary sector. Moreover, 
social-welfare related sectors like education and healthcare and wholesale and retail trade 
that have not yet been targeted in India as sectors competent for attracting FDI inflows, 
but these have contributed to FDI in China. Labeled as the cheapest workshop in the 
world, China attracts FDI mainly into the manufacturing sector, which accounts for over 
70 percent of the approvals; the service sector accounts for less than 1 percent of the 
inflows, which is not so in India. More than 30 percent of the FDI inflows in India were 
in the services sector over the 1990s (see Table 11). China has, since 1998, stepped up its 
efforts to encourage foreign investments into technology development and innovation. 
Several incentives, such as import duty exemption for equipment and technology brought 
into China by foreign-invested research companies, tax breaks for incomes obtained from 
transfer of technology, and business tax exemption to foreign enterprises transferring 
advanced technology, are luring foreign investors to China. Telecommunications in 
China is yet to be opened up to foreign investors and in computer software India has the 
lead compared to China. 
 
Sectors with public relevance like media, radio, television etc. have also drawn 
FDI inflows. Manufacturing and real estate are the two sectors that have attracted the 
most FDI over the last three years. Some sectors that indicate very small FDI (less than 
0.5 percent), have been recorded zero in the table. But what is important is that even 
these sectors (such as geological prospecting and water conservancy, healthcare, sports & 
social welfare, education, culture & arts, radio, film & television, and scientific research 
& polytechnical services) have captured the attention of foreign investors and are capable 
of attracting higher FDI in the future. It is interesting to note that banking and insurance 
has not been able to attract even 1 percent of the total FDI inflows in China, primarily 
due to the lack of reform in China’s financial sector. 
 
 
3. Probing the Causes Behind the Structural Differences in FDI Inflows between 
India and China 
 
A vital query at this level could be a probe into the limiting factors that have 
prevented India from attracting FDI inflows in similar magnitudes and diversity as in 
China. China most certainly attracted large sums of FDI in the manufacturing sector, a 
significant part of which could definitely be channelized to India had India not been 
plagued with inadequacies in the prevailing policy environment that directly and 
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indirectly affected its FDI inflows. India’s product reservation for the small-scale 
industry, stringent labor laws, inability of the firms to exit, if conditions so demanded, 
(no exit policy), lack of decision-making authority with India’s state governments and 
hence lack of competition among Indian states to attract FDI (as against China’s 
provinces) were some of the key factors why India lost large sums of FDI that could have 
probably come India’s way, but instead went to China. Such restrictions in India virtually 
assured China’s dominance compared with India. With the above factors in play, China 
was almost assured of facing virtually no competition from India as far as the labor-
intensive manufacturing sector was concerned.  
 
Moreover, the fall in FDI in electrical equipment manufacturing in India, 
especially after the removal of quantitative restrictions, might partly be because of cheap 
Chinese goods flooding the domestic market. FDI in electrical equipment (excluding 
computer software) slumped from $208.8 million in 2000 to $149.3 million in 2002. 
Also, the Indian policy-makers failed to design appropriate export-oriented FDI policies 
to attract foreign investors as was competently achieved in China. Not only in the 
manufacturing sector, but the service sector in India too requires policy reform. The retail 
trade industry, which is gradually receiving due importance in China as a sector of 
potential FDI, has been totally disregarded in India. The role of sub-national government 
as a catalyst to FDI inflows has also been ignored in India while decentralization of FDI 
seeking and related powers have given immense incentives to the respective provincial 
governments in China too induce and sustain FDI inflows within their own jurisdictions. 
This has led to healthy competition among the different sub-national governments in 
China to attract FDI inflows. This section will discuss some of these features that could 
have played their roles in retarding the FDI-attractiveness of India vis-à-vis China.  
 
3.1 FDI in the Retail Sector in India and China  
 
Retailing is one of the biggest private sector industries the world over, with 
annual sales exceeding $6 trillion, ahead of financial services (US$ 5.1 trillion) and 
engineering (US$ 3.2 trillion). This sector accounts for about 10 percent of GDP in the 
western economies and has generated 18 percent shareholder returns between 1994 and 
1999 as compared to banks (9 percent) and insurance (15 percent)24. It is also a major 
employment generator in many economies (16 percent in U.S., 15 percent in Brazil, and 7 
percent in China). In the developed countries, the retail industry has developed into a full-
fledged industry with more than three-fourths of the total retail trade being handled by the 
organized sector. Modern formats of retail made their appearances in developing 
economies such as Thailand, Poland and China25 in the 1990s primarily because of the 
                                                          
24 “The Retail Sector in India”, GPS Monograph Series Volume 1, Issue 10, October 2001. 
http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache:bLfygT2a-
rcJ:www.gpservices.net/monograph/Retail.html+retail+sector+fdi+data+india+china&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 
25 In Thailand, seven of the world's top 10 retailers have made significant investments — Carrefour, 
Casino, Makro, Royal Ahold, Jusco have set up shop in Thailand. In China, three of the top 10 global 
retailers, have made investments, such as Carrefour, Wal Mart, 7-Eleven.  
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entry of global retail chains, mainly through FDI. Organized retail trade has also been 
flourishing in South Asia in recent years (see Table 14). The retail sector is also a 
contributor to the productivity of an economy as is evident in the U.S. where the annual 
retail productivity growth reached a stunning 6.3 percent in the period from 1995 through 





Retailing, within India, is a huge industry27, accounting for about 10 percent of 
GDP and 6.7 percent of employment, while in China, retail accounts for 8 percent of 
GDP and again around 6 percent of employment9. FDI in pure retailing is not permitted in 
the country, but foreign retailers can operate in India through local franchisees. Dairy 
Farm is the only foreign retailer with full-fledged operations in India, and it made its 
entry into the country within a regulatory window during 1993–1995 when the 
government opened up a window to retail FDI. 
 
The retail trade business in India creates about 6.7 percent of total employment, 
employing nearly 21 million people28. It amounts to about $180 billion market and is six 
times bigger than Thailand and four-five times bigger than that in South Korea and 
Taiwan. India has one of the highest retail densities in the world, over 12 million29 small, 
roadside retail operations, employing about twelve million people (almost 15 percent of 
Indian adults). However, the sector remains fragmented, unorganized30 and small31 in unit 
                                                          
26 Johnson, B.C. (2002), “Retail: The Wal-Mart Effect”; The McKinsey Quarterly, 2002 Number 1. 
(http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.asp?tk=406864:1152:20&ar=1152&L2=20&L3=75) 
 
27 Although retail sector is not yet officially considered as an industry in India. In practice, retailing should 
be officially recognized as an "industry" following which the retail sector could secure easy access to bank 
finance and also aid substantial growth of organized retail.  
28 http://www.europeanbusinessgroupindia.com/Business%20Prospects.htm#retail 
29 According to a case study in China (Rosling, A. (2002), there are 12 million kirana shops (small 
individually owned businesses), 96% of which are under 500 square feet with limited stock or choice but 
convenient local and service-oriented. 
 
30 According to a survey by AT Kearney, only 5% segment of the retail market is organized. 
Source:http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:vjPLqr58KUUJ:www.indiaonestop.com/retailing.htm+retail
+sector+survey+india+fdi&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 
31 As much as 96 per cent of the 5 million-plus outlets are smaller than 500 square feet in area. This means 
that India per capita retailing space is about 2 square feet (compared to 16 square feet in the United States). 





size no significant presence of large, efficient retailers. Most retail outlets are family-
owned and offering limited products and finance facilities. Because of the small size, the 
retail sector is considered non-viable and is in many instances denied finance facilities by 
banks. The growth engines of the industry are the grocery and apparel segments. The 
value added at retailing is quite low due to huge losses resulting from disorganized 
industry and the presence of a long chain of middlemen.  
 
 The late 1990s witnessed a boom in the consumer durable industry, and improved 
services, and led to rising income levels, changes in life styles, higher demand for better 
and wider variety of products. These in turn led to increasing economies of scale with the 
aid of modern supply and distribution of management solutions. This prompted a 
situation for building an organized retail sector. Organized retailing in India is 
concentrated in select medium to large cities, and that too, in a limited manner with only 
one or two reasonably large malls per urban area. Within the retail trade as a whole, 
taking into account the organized and unorganized sections, barely 3 percent of the stores 
in the country can be classified as mid-to-large sized units32. However, the retail industry 
is likely to diversify geographically within the country as the purchasing power of the 
suburban middle class increases. Already, consumer goods firms such as P&G and Sony 
are beginning to find that a higher proportion of their demand is being generated by 
demand-side pull in India’s rural areas rather than supply-side push. 
 
But the share of the organized segment with formats like multi brand stores, 
malls, super stores, franchise agreements and company owned single brand stores is 
currently estimated to be only 2 percent of the total retailing business in India, compared 
to 80 percent in the U.S., 40 percent in Thailand, and 20 percent in China, leaving still 
untapped the large market potential33. In India, old-fashioned ‘kirana’ shops dominate the 
retail sector, while the organized segment comprises up-market departmental stores such 
as Shopper’s Stop, Ebony, Food World, Piramyd etc that basically take off from the 
western model. 
 
 Experience of other countries suggests that FDI in the Indian retail sector 
could enable the sector to become organized and modern. But, foreign participation 
in the Indian retail industry is banned since 199734, except for the cash-and-carry 
wholesale route35 where wholesalers cannot open retail shops to sell to consumers 
                                                          
32 “Retailing in India”; Euromonitor Emerging Market Report, 1998. 
33 http://www.europeanbusinessgroupindia.com/Business%20Prospects.htm#retail 
34 Prior to 1997, FDI was allowed in only two retail ventures - Nanz Food Products in 1992 and Spencer 
and Company Ltd in 1996. 
35 Germany's Metro AG was the first foreign company to enter India with a cash-and-carry venture. 
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directly, 100 percent foreign ownership is permitted, and for franchising. This 
restriction has constrained the flow of funds and technology into this sector. 
Presently, global players are entering India, indirectly, via the licensee/local 
franchisee route, since FDI is not allowed in the retail sector. Dairy Farm is the only 
foreign retailer with full-fledged operations in India, and it made its entry into the country 
within a regulatory window (1993 – 1995), when the Indian government opened up a 
window to retail FDI. 
 
Several surveys have been undertaken in recent years to evaluate the role of FDI 
in this sector. McKinsey India has undertaken such surveys either with its parent body, 
McKinsey Global Institute (in 2001) or in collaboration with CII (in 2003). Such studies 
advocate that reforms in the retail sector by way of allowing FDI can improve 
productivity by 2.5 percent and annual output by 12 percent, creating eight million jobs. 
Further, it is being argued that once productivity levels rise, huge capital inflows by 
foreign investors will follow in upstream activities once FDI is allowed. Also, the report 
felt that at present consumers were ‘deprived of price advantage, choice and variety’ and 
hence enhanced competition would benefit them.  
 
According to A T Kearney, Global Retail Development Index, 2002, India ranks 
4th among 30 emergent markets (see Table 15). This ranking of the emerging countries 
has been made according to three factors: economic and political risk, level of retail 
saturation and difference between GDP and retail growth time pressure. While country 
risk and market saturation were given 40 percentage weightage each, the time pressure 
was give 20 percent. 
 
The study observes that India possesses the strength of one billion residents and a 
retail market that is forecast to grow at 30 percent compounded annual rate over the next 
five years, according to the projections of A T Kearney. In spite of the significant 
promise for new retailers in India, the study points out that the country is plagued with 
the limitations of complex tax structure, restrictions on foreign direct investment and 
heavy regulation.   
 
Among legal and political constraints in India, the index factored heavy regulation 
of FDI in this sector, complex bureaucratic clearance process, a large number of taxes on 
organized retail and archaic laws leading to poor availability and high costs of real estate. 
Current norms do not allow majority shareholding by foreign investors in retail industry.  
 
FDI in retailing could theoretically offer consumers with better deals in choice, 
price, quality, and variety36, new opportunities for farmers and food processors, better 
employment opportunities, higher tax collection and an overall development stimulus for 
                                                          
36 FDI in retail industry could create competition through the entry of MNCs that reduces prices, 
encourages product and service innovation, and generates enhanced customer experience. 
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the economy. It is also a major driver for urban and real estate development. Thus, the 
retail sector has the long-term potential of productivity gains leading to larger income and 
employment opportunities by stimulating agricultural growth and consumer demand.  In 
spite of acknowledging these long-term merits of FDI in retail, the Indian government has 
repeatedly dissuaded from lifting its ban on the FDI in the retail sector on economic and 
political considerations, which is retained even in the Report of the Steering Group on 
FDI, Planning Commission in August 200237.  
 
Under existing norms, the FDI in wholesale cash-and-carry forward is permitted, 
but not in retail trading. However, foreign retail chains are making an appearance as 
franchisees. Marks & Spencer, the UK's leading retail chain, and Shoprite, South Africa's 
largest grocery chain supermarket have come in as franchisees. While foreign retailers 
are eyeing India, awaiting for some clear direction in policy from the government, few of 
them – if any – are likely to commit large sums of money as investment, as has been 
identified by the McKinsey study38, given that the purchasing power of the Indian middle 




By contrast, the McKinsey Report documents that China began to liberalize 
retailing a decade ago but with severe restrictions. FDI in retailing was permitted in this 
sector in 1992 although it was restricted to a few major cities and provincial capitals 
including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou and the SEZs. Modern, organized retailing 
formats made their appearance in China largely on account of the foreign investment in 
its retail sector. About 40 foreign retailers have secured approval since 1992 attracting 
$22 billion (i.e., 3.6 percent of total FDI). Some well-known foreign retail corporations 
that have established themselves in the Chinese market include Nike, Wal-Mart, 
Carrefour, 7-Eleven, and Giordano. These retailers, amongst others, account for some of 
the 10 percent of total merchandise that is sold through supermarket format in China, but 
it has taken China’s market a significantly long ten years to evolve to the present level. 
By 1997, 16 retail joint ventures had been signed in China, contracting an investment of 
                                                          
37 The Report of the Steering Group on FDI, Planning Commission in August 2002 acknowledged that FDI 
in food retailing would lead to more efficient supply chain management systems that could reduce the price 
paid by consumers and price received by farmers. Thus both consumers and  producers could be benefited 
and also a profitable avenue for FDI could be generated for the industry. But at the same time it retained the 
ban on FDI in the retail sector. The decision was taken in view of the possible unfavorable effect on the 
traditional retailers, employment scenario and the opportunities to the nascent Indian players in the retail 
sector. The idea is that FDI in retail will at best penetrate into metros and larger cities. Since investments 
will cater to a niche market (catering barely to 1 per cent of the population in select metros) it gives a lie to 
the argument that allowing FDI will benefit a sizeable number of consumers. Moreover, the Indian 
experience of organized retail segment that has modeled itself on the western retail strategies so far does 
not suggest any of these benefits to consumers at large. There is also the short-term possibility of loss of 
income by the small family-run counter stores and small traders in direct competition with the new entrants.  





U.S. $ 1.2 billion39. However, China, just like India, has a large number of small corner 
stores as part of the retail sector, 9 million to be precise and most of them unorganized40.  
 
Although up until now, foreign ownership was restricted in 49 percent of joint 
venture with a local partner, with the latter holding majority stake, the current restrictions 
on FDI would be waned out within 5 years as condition of WTO entry. The study by 
Rosling (Rosling, A. (2002) has shown that the growth of retailing in China since the 
permission of FDI in this sector in 1992 has improved the quality of experience, choice 
and prices for the Chinese shoppers, catalyzed the growth of traditional retailers and 
raised the employment in retailing. Also, the majority of the leading retail outlets are 
Chinese-owned. 
 
Recommendations for India 
 
Distribution service and retail trade occupies a prominent place in the economy of 
a country for its potential to kick-start the process of economic development. The retail 
industry, nurtured properly, can benefit everyone connected with it like 
suppliers/manufacturers, government and workforce. The experience of China and other 
developing countries shows that liberalizing FDI inflows into the retail sector generates 
macro economic and micro economic advantages for the country. So the policy choice for 
India is to choose between the two alternative scenarios. Either it has to protect the 
existing fragmented and unorganized wholesale and retail systems or it can change 
policies to encourage modern retailing to generate advantages for consumers, farmers and 
the food-processing industry. 
 
But, merely by allowing FDIs in this sector will not bring in investments, 
unless the FDI policies make it attractive for MNCs to pump in capital to fuel 
growth along with systems, expertise and know how that will also shorten the 
learning process in India. To what extent MNCs will bring their capital to the retail 
sector will depend on how far the government can formulate good overall economic 
policies thus creating the conditions for a conducive business environment. The 
government would need to deal with complementary areas such as labor policy, 
infrastructure development, fiscal management, land reforms, etc. To be more 
specific, the government need to rewrite the real estate laws, restructure the tax 
regime41, remove bottlenecks in the supply chain42, do away with the constraints on 
                                                          
39 See McKinsey Report. 
40 Chan, W., Perez, J., Perkins, A. & shu, M. (1997), “China’s retail markets are evolving more quickly 
than companies anticipate”; The McKinsey Quarterly, 1997 Number 2. 
 (http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.asp?tk=406864:220:37&ar=220&L2=37&L3=97) 
41 For example, the government can adopt a uniform sales tax rate across states, and time, introduce Value-
Added Taxation (VAT) and also eliminate octroi wherever it is levied. It should also enforce tax collection 
from small retailers. 
42 Removal of bottlenecks in the supply chain could improve the efficiency level in retailing. It could also 
increase the availability of products and reduce product costs. 
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processing, manufacturing and distribution by relaxing the small scale industry 
(SSI) reservations43, access and develop new skills, streamline licensing process for 
retailing44 and invest significantly in infrastructure. It is only through these means 
that it will realize the aforementioned benefits of FDI in its retailing sector, amongst 
others, viz. employment growth; improved supply chain, inventory and logistics 
management; productivity enhancements; and backward integration into increased 
manufacturing45. This idea has also been supported in a study by McKinsey that 
showed that if retail sector and complementary reforms are fully implemented in India by 
2010, productivity of large retail chains in India has the potential to touch 90 percent of 
U.S. levels, dramatically up from the current 20 percent46. 
 
3.2 Export-orientation in FDI in India and China  
 
It is well-recognized that export-oriented FDI is an important means of expanding 
manufactured exports for developing countries, as it helps improve the quality and 
competitiveness of manufacturing industries. It is well documented that in the 1970s and 
1980s, FDI played a crucial role in the rapid export growth achieved by East Asia's newly 




China has been successful in attracting huge export oriented FDI inflows in recent 
years. The significant role played by the foreign funded enterprises demonstrate the 
export-orientation of FDI in China. Table 16 shows that over the late 1990s till 2001. The 
share of foreign funded enterprises in Chinese exports has consistently remained over 40 
percent during this period and has exceeded 50 percent in 2001. China has pushed up the 
MNC share in exports from 17 percent in 1991 to over 45 percent in 1999 to around 50 
percent in 2001 as compared to a mere 3 percent of exports by MNC affiliates in India.  
 
                                                          
43 Relaxation of the SSI reservation will allow small-scale firms to increase scale and become far more 
productive and competitive. 
44 State governments should make all licenses and permits for retail available through a single agency, at 
least at the city level. Providing one-time licenses for multiple stores in a chain will ease the bureaucratic 
hurdle experienced by modern retailers. 
 
45Refer to the paper “How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries” by Magnus Blomstrom and Ari 
Kokko, both of the Stockholm School of Economics, for further details and explanation. 
 
46 Di Lodovico, A.M., Lewis, W.W., Palmade, V. & Sankhe, S. (2001), “India – From emerging to 




China invited foreign direct investors to provide the capital and the expertise to achieve 
export competitiveness in a wide range of sectors, including electronics, apparel, plastic 
toys, stuffed animals, ceramics, and many other labor-intensive sectors.  In each sector, 
the key was to link foreign investor capital and expertise with a large and low-cost 
Chinese labor force.  The foreign investors brought in the product design, specialized 
machine tools and capital goods, key intermediate products, and knowledge of world 
marketing channels.  The Chinese assured these foreign investors certain key conditions 
for profitability, such as low taxes, reliable infrastructure, physical security, adequate 
power, decent logistics for the import and export of goods, and so forth. 
 
Table 17 exhibits the official breakup of Chinese exports into primary and 
manufacturing commodities over the 1990s through 2001. It is remarkable to note that 
Chinese official export data does not give any category of service in its data-base. This 
confirms that the contribution of services in China’s exports is negligible. We observe 
that the manufactured exports as a percentage of total exports have always demonstrated 
a rising trend reaching around 90 percent in 2001. Within the manufacturing exports, 
about 57 percent was  by the chemicals, light & textile industrial products, machinery and 
transport equipment, minerals and metallurgical products, rubber products etc. over 1991-
2001 (see Table 18). Presumably, a substantial percentage of these exports especially in 




Focus of FDI in India is mainly on sectors such as infrastructure, power, capital 
goods and food processing, all of which do not fall under export-oriented units. Only one-
fourth of total approvals were directed towards major exporting sectors like textiles, 
chemicals & pharmaceuticals, leather goods, transport, metallurgical industries and food 
processing industries. Of India’s export basket of software products and services, gems 
and jewelry, minerals, and agricultural products, FDI is allowed only in software 
products. India needs a larger export market for manufactured goods where FDI could 
flow in. For example, the handicraft sector has consistently made the largest contribution 
to exports over the 1990s. But since this sector falls under the reserved small-scale 
category, FDI is practically non-existent in this area.  
 
Recommendations for India 
 
Perhaps with the opening up of the small-scale industries, MNCs could be 
attracted and export-oriented FDI could get a significant boost. Also, comparing Table 18 
(machinery and transport equipment) with Table 19 (engineering), we observe that India 
lags very much behind China in the export of machinery and electronics goods. This can 
                                                          
47 It is documented that in the export of mechanical and electrical products, the share of foreign-invested 
firms rose from 43.7 per cent in 1996 to 52.4 per cent in 1999.  
 
 24
be mitigated if India adopts competent measures to attract FDI from the MNCs in these 
capital-intensive industries. 
 
3.3 SEZs in India and China  
 
Export-oriented industries can be fostered through the creation of different types 
of special economic zones. Virtually all of the East and South-east Asian countries have 
utilized export-processing zones (EPZs) or other special economic zones (SEZs) to help 
attract foreign investment and to initiate the process of manufacturing export-led growth. 
These zones have attempted to carve out a geographical zone in which export-businesses 
can conduct profitable export-oriented activities, exempt from costly regulations, tax 
laws, and labor standards that apply more generally within the country. More generally, 
the relatively successful industrial policies have had a few common characteristics. First, 
they have aimed to promote exports, rather than to protect the domestic market; second, 
they have provided subsidies on the basis of successful performance (for example, the 
growth of exports) rather than to cover losses; and third, they have been temporary rather 




At the center of China’s strategy to attract investors’ and to develop China as a 
major platform for labor-intensive manufacturing exports were the SEZs in which 
favorable export conditions were assured. The urban export-oriented enterprises in China 
were encouraged by the designation of a growing number of SEZs, coastal48 open cities 
and economic and technological development zones, all designed to encourage 
manufacturing exports. These SEZs, along China’s coastline, were designed to give 
foreign investors and domestic enterprises favorable conditions for rapid export 
promotion.  All key aspects of the export environment were secured.  Exporters, for 
example, were allowed to import intermediate products and capital goods duty free.  
They were given generous tax holidays.  The exporters were assured decent physical 
infrastructure, often through the provision of land, power, physical security, and transport 
to the ports, within specially created industrial parks. China has demonstrated through its 
own experience that creation of SEZs attract substantial FDI for the export sector. 
 
                                                          
48 In the early years of the reforms beginning in 1979, China began coastal development policy, resulting a 
marked shift in term so of producing for export. Coastal, urban-based industry can serve both the internal 
market and the international market, and can more readily make logistical links with foreign suppliers and 
customers than can interior-based enterprises. New export-oriented units are therefore heavily concentrated 
on the coast. Manufacturers in interior regions can of course service the domestic market, particularly in 
consumer goods such as processed foods, but the potential for rapid growth based on the internal market 
tends to be more limited than the growth based on exports to the world market.   
 
49 The eight EPZs in India have contributed a meager Rs85.52bn in exports (4.3% of country’s exports) in 
2001.That one of the reason for failure was the poor quality of infrastructure and other facilities is evident 
from the fact that the government invests only Rs170mn annually in the seven of the government-owned 
EOUs. 
 25
In 1980, the Chinese authorities set up Shenzhen SEZ, the first of its kind in the 
country. Today, China has five SEZs. Of these, four — Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shantou and 
Zhuhai — were established 20 years back and the fifth, Hainan, was set up in 1988. All 
the five SEZs had unique locations. Shenzhen (near Hong Kong), Shantou (a major home 
of overseas Chinese) and Zhuhai (near Macao) are in the Guangdong province. The other 
SEZ, Xiamen, in the Fujian province, is nearer Taiwan. The last was set up in the Hainan 
Islands in 1988 promoting the island to the Province status. Setting up these zones close 
to internationally reputed commercial destinations was basically for easier access to 
foreign investments, modern technology and managerial expertise. The strategic locations 
of these SEZs perhaps explain the alacrity FDI by the expatriate Chinese since the 1980s. 
 
The locational advantage of these SEZs attracted foreign investors that spurted 
FDI in China — with Hong Kong accounting for about 60 percent of the total inflows. 
Initially, the majority of foreign investors were NRCs from Hong Kong who were 
engaged in trading. Later, MNCs started investing in technology-oriented sectors even as 
China liberalized its foreign investment policy further to attract modern technology. The 
Guangdong province, which has the largest number of SEZs, became the most attractive 
foreign investment destination. In 2001, over 25 percent of China's FDI flowed into 
Guangdong.  
 
These SEZs, along China’s coastline, were designed to give foreign investors and 
domestic enterprises favorable conditions for rapid export promotion.  The SEZs were 
given extra-territorial rights to function as a foreign land for all financial purposes, 
despite being a part of the country. All key aspects of the export environment were 
secured.  Exporters, for example, were allowed to import intermediate products and 
capital goods duty free.  They were given generous tax holidays.  Another important 
aspect was the attention paid to infrastructure. The exporters were assured decent 
physical infrastructure, often through the provision of land, power, physical security, and 
transport to the ports, within specially created industrial parks. The quality of 
infrastructure ensures that there is no stoppage of work, no delays and no loss due to 
bottlenecks. All the SEZs, which China has developed, are on virgin land where there 
was no trade or commerce earlier.  
 
This has helped in devising the right quantum of infrastructure required to sustain 
a defined quantum of population. This ensures that there is no unnecessary load on the 
infrastructure, as the population grows unbounded. These special areas also received 
various kinds of favorable tax and regulatory treatment, such as tax holidays, and duty-
free access to imported inputs and capital goods needed for export production. Thus, the 
SEZs and other special areas were akin to the EPZs that had been used in other parts of 
Asia as of their initial export-led growth. Most joint ventures and wholly owned foreign 
companies operating in China qualify for corporate tax holidays and reductions because 
they are engaged in production, are located in a special incentive zone or are 
technologically advanced or export oriented.  
 
 The Chinese SEZs are very large in magnitude, and in addition to export 
processing they promote activities such as commerce, tourism, housing, agriculture and 
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industrial production. These zones are in direct competition with each other at both the 
domestic and the international level. They are typically marked by minimum 
bureaucracy, good infrastructure, generous tax holidays for manufacturing units, 




India also had similar models of EPZ and Export Oriented Units (EOU). EPZs are 
located at various places including Cochin, Falta (near Calcutta), Kandla, Chennai, 
Noida, Santacruz (Mumbai), Vishakhapatnam and Surat. A unit could be set up in these 
zones subject to availability of space. Incentives provided to attract investment in these 
areas were 'zero import duty', a 'special 10-year income tax rebate' and other incentives. 
 
But these eight special zones failed to achieve the export targets49. There are 
several reasons for the failure of India’s EPZs. We discuss some of them later in this 
section. In April 2000, the government of India introduced a new SEZ scheme. The 
scheme allowed for converting some of the existing EPZs into SEZs to provide an 
internationally competitive and hassle free environment50 for export production and also 
to attract export-oriented FDI. The Export/Import Policy of 2000 (chapter 9 para 30) 
defined the SEZ as a specifically delineated, duty free enclave deemed to be foreign 
territory for the purpose of trade operations and duties and tariffs. Units may be set up in 
SEZ for manufacture of goods and rendering of services. All the import/export operations 
of the SEZ units will be on self-certification basis. The units in these zones have to be a 
net foreign exchange earner but they shall not be subjected to any pre-determined value 
addition or minimum export performance requirements.  
 
The setting up of an SEZ unit was made open to any private, public, joint sector 
or state government. There would be no customs and excise duties, automatic approval 
for all items barring select ones on the negative list. Up to 75 percent of the earnings of 
the company units in SEZs could be retained in foreign exchange. The infrastructure and 
management in these zones were envisaged to be provided by the private promoters to 
ensure quality and the proper pricing of services. The units within SEZs are planned to be 
declared as public utility services so that sudden strikes are not permissible. All supplies 
going into the SEZs from the domestic markets will be duty-free, whereas in reverse the 
domestic sector will have to pay the equivalent amount of taxes as applicable in similar 
imports.  
 
Units operating in these zones have full flexibility of operations and can import 
duty free capital goods and raw material. The movement of goods to and fro between 
ports and SEZ are unrestricted. The Government has converted EPZs located at Kandla 
                                                          
50 SEZs are areas where export production can take place free from plethora of rules and regulations 
governing imports and exports. The objective is to bypass the bureaucratic hurdles, high tax levels and the 
inherent problem of poor infrastructure. 
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and Surat (Gujarat), Cochin (Kerala), Santa Cruz (Mumbai-Maharashtra), Falta (West 
Bengal), Madras (Tamil Nadu), Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh) and Noida (Uttar 
Pradesh) into operational SEZs. SEZs are approved for establishment at Kanpur and 
Bhadohi (Uttar Pradesh), Indore (Madhya Pradesh), Kulpi (West Bengal), Paradeep and 
Gopalpur (Orissa), Dahej, and Mundra (Gujarat), Dronagiri (Andhra Pradesh), Kakinara 
(Kerala) and Nanguneri (Tamil Nadu). 
 
India versus China 
 
India, like China, is also offering a host of incentives to boost FDI at the SEZs 
such as duty-free imports, tax holidays, freedom from customs procedures, etc. In the 
Exim Policy 2002-07 as well as in the 2002 Budget, a comprehensive policy package was 
drawn up for attracting foreign investments in SEZs involving fiscal concessions, export 
incentives etc., for both the SEZ developers as well as the SEZ units. Units operating in 
these trade zones will be provided with additional incentives and given more flexibility in 
their operations, such as flexible labor laws. Not only will the government provide them 
the necessary infrastructure but they would be able to import raw materials duty-free and 
would also be able to access those from the domestic tariff area (DTA) without payment 
of terminal excise duty. Within the SEZ, no permission would be required for inter-unit 
sales or transfer of goods.  
 
The share of SEZs in total exports in 2001 was 10.5 percent in China, whereas the 
corresponding figure for India in 2001-2002 was 4.4 percent (Majumder, S. (2003). 
Hence, the question that remains is whether the generous offering of incentives is by 
itself enough to ensure greater investment flows. In other words, merely switching from 
EPZs to SEZs, without undertaking the required structural changes, can success of SEZs 
be guaranteed. EPZs and SEZs are different in size — while the former is an industrial 
estate, the latter is an industrial township. In China, each SEZ is well over 1,000 hectares, 
the minimum recommended area. In India, the EPZs converted into SEZs are not even a 
third of the recommended size. Among the converted SEZs, the one in Noida is the 
largest but extends only 310 hectares. The Santa Cruz Electronics Export Processing 
Zone (SEEPZ), the first SEZ in India, is only 93 hectares. 
 
Another ingredient of infrastructure is the availability of power at competitive 
rate. Apart from cheap power (the price of power is around 4 to 6 cents per unit), there is 
no power failure in China, as in India. Moreover, the concept of minimum demand 
(minimum amount paid whether or not power is used) for power is nonexistent in China, 
as in India. Also, bank interest is less than 4 percent in China as against about 14 percent 
in India51.  
 
Commensurate with their size, the scope of SEZs are much wider and their 
linkages with the domestic economy stronger. SEZs provide supportive infrastructure 
                                                          




such as housing, ports, roads and telecommunication and, as a result, have a wider 
industrial base. Compared to EPZs, SEZs give more in terms of exports, industrial 
growth, investments, both domestic and foreign, and employment generation. Hence, 
undertaking the required structural changes in terms of supportive infrastructure becomes 
mandatory to ensure success of SEZs. The conversion of EPZs into SEZs can be 
successful if SEZs are carved out with the recommended size and dedicated infrastructure 
to provide uninterrupted power supply, for instance. With such small areas of SEZs in 
India, the requisite infrastructure and services required of an SEZ cannot be created nor 
multiple economic activities. 
 
 Decentralization of decision-making authority was also a major reason for SEZ 
success in China. Provincial and local authorities were made partners and stakeholders, 
by delegating to them powers to approve foreign investment. The SEZ authorities in 
China can approve foreign investment proposals up to $30 million. In India, until 
recently, only State governments are allowed to set up SEZs52 and the powers for foreign 
investment approvals are vested with the Development Commissioners, who are the 
representatives of the Central Government.  
 
The flexible labor laws with the hire-and-fire policy in SEZs has been one of the 
biggest attractions for foreign investors in China. The new labor law consists of 107 
articles, but none of these is more than one paragraph. All jobs are on contract basis, 
which stand terminated upon the expiry of the terms, which can be fixed/flexible or for a 
specific job. In contrast, the labor laws in India are extremely stringent and the  Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947 does not allow companies with 100 or more employees to retrench 
labor without seeking prior permission from the concerned state government, which is 
very hard to come by.  
 
In China, the major responsibility for the SEZs rests with local and provincial 
governments, whereas in India, the responsibilities remain heavily with Delhi.  Under 
those circumstances, many state governments were actually averse to the idea of EPZs in 
their state. It should be noted, however, that since the year 2000, India has begun to put in 
place SEZs, similar to those in China, and the federal and state governments are engaged 
in the process of attempting to reform critical issues, such as labor laws, land laws, and 
the federal government has also been pruning the long list of items on the small-scale 
product reservation list.  
 
India too experimented with special zones, mainly EPZs, but one has to say that 
India’s approach, at least until the early to mid 1990s to export zones, as engines for 
attracting foreign investors, has been one of relative neglect rather than support.  While 
China’s five main special economic zones (Shenzen, Zhuhai, Santou, Xiamen, Hainan) 
proved to be very successful in attracting FDI, boosting exports and creating large-scale 
employment, India’s main export processing zones, or EPZs (Kandla, Santacruz, Noida, 
Madras, Cochin and Falta), managed to do very little, both in absolute levels and as a 
                                                          
52 As per the 2000 EXIM policy of India, SEZs can be set-up by private sector, joint sector as well. 
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proportion of total Indian exports.  India’s EPZs have not performed as well as China’s 
SEZs for many reasons, including:  
 
1. limited scale and overcrowding of units in the EPZs 
2. insufficient logistical links with ports and airports 
3. poor infrastructure in areas surrounding the zones (e.g. unpaved roads and poor 
physical security) 
4. government ambivalence and red-tape regarding inward FDI 
5. unclear incentive packages governing inward investment, and 
6. lack of interest and authority of state and local governments, and the private sector, 
compared with the central government, in the design, set-up, and functioning of the 
zones. 
 
Recommendations for India 
 
The SEZs in India could be fostered as SEZs investment-friendly areas so as to 
increase the inflow of FDI into high technology and manufacturing activities. They could 
create manufacturing facilities that would serve as supply partners to renowned global 
firms, whose brand names and global reach will give relatively easy access to world 
markets for parts and products made in Indian SEZs. This would require excellence in 
cost, quality and an ability to provide in-time delivery. SEZs should aim to provide 
modern physical infrastructure and the firms operating therein could help benefit from 
India’s skilled workforce. These Zones must operate on a new set of industrial, trade, 
tariff and labor policies that would make investment in these zones competitive with 
those in China or other competing nations in Asia.  
 
The policies and procedures for investment and various clearances must be 
simplified and made as transparent as possible. The success of these zones would depend 
on their coastal location, world-class infrastructure in high-speed highways, access to 
suppliers, housing, education, health, transport (air and sea), water, power, information 
technology and telecommunications. The central government should function in 
conjunction with the subnational governments and the private sector in the development 
of the SEZs. 
 
3.4 Sub-national Government and FDI in India and China  
 
Globalization has created incentives for decentralization of governmental 
relations in a way that allows local governments to play an active developmental role. 
Brazil, China and Russia are examples where regional governments have taken the lead 
in pushing reforms and prompting further actions by the Central Government. In Brazil, 
Sao Paulo and Minais Gerais were the reform leaders at the regional level. The coastal 
provinces in China are the fastest growing regions of China and are also leaders of 
China’s reform process. In Russia, reform leaders in Nizhny Novgorod and in the far-east 






 As mentioned previously, in India, while the State 
governments are allowed to set up the SEZs, the powers for 
foreign investment approvals are vested with the 
Development Commissioners, who are the representatives of 
the Central Government. Table 20 shows the export performances and the 
corresponding ranks of these SEZs over 2000 through 2003. We observe that while 
SEEPZ and Noida consistently maintain their first and second positions respectively, the 
other six SEZs have been vacillating in their export performance over the specified 
period. Tables 21 and 22 show that there is indeed a strong association between the 
performance of SEZs in terms of exports and FDI of the states where these SEZs were 
located. The FDI potential as perceived by foreign investors in six of these seven states 
where these were located (Kerala did not figure) were among the top nine states in India 
in 2001(Table 21). Barring Kerala, the other six states were among the top 10 states 




One of the achievements of the sub-national governments has been in the area of 
attracting FDI as in China where the provincial and local authorities are vested with 
power to approve foreign investment up to a certain level. Table 23 shows the export 
performance and the FDI of the three Chinese provinces with SEZs. Although the 
percentage share of exports has been falling for each of these provinces (signifying the 
strengthening of other regions like Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, etc. as competing trade 
regions), yet Guandong maintains the lead followed by Fujian and Hainan. The same 
order has been maintained for the FDIs. We have already noted that Guangdong had three 
SEZs. Perhaps the largeness in the number of SEZs in Guangdong explains its export 
performance over the other two provinces with SEZs.  
 
Recommendations for India 
 
Economic policy making authority has been concentrated at the central 
government level in India. It is essential that this authority be devolved to the states such 
that the private sector can function more freely in all the states. This process has started 
in bits and pieces and some states have attached a high priority to attracting FDI. 
However different state tax regimes, procedures and customs make doing business more 
complex.  
 
The state governments should play a proactive role in attracting the MNCs to 
India. The major role that the state governments in India could play in the FDI arena is to 
provide an appropriate investor-friendly environment to the MNCs who are interested in 
making FDI in the respective states. Apart from providing incentives for SEZs in the state 
jurisdictions the state governments also need to review and redefine the legislations 
within the states’ ambit like the land laws and certain labor laws that entail hire and fire 
policies.  
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 Improvement of infrastructure at the state level and wider awareness of the state 
in the potential FDI-source countries seem to be significant factors for India. For 
example, according to a 2003 estimate, there were around 50 Japanese companies in 
Tamil Nadu, either wholly owned or as joint ventures. These companies are mainly in 
auto components, biotechnology and the apparel industry. But because of lack of 
Japanese awareness about the state of Tamil Nadu’s potential, Japanese investment into 
Tamil Nadu has been just three percent of the total FDI in India55.  
 
4. Investment Climate  
 
Since the initiation of economic reforms by the Indian government in 1991(ten 
years after China's open door policy), attracting FDI has been an important area. The 
United Front Government had targeted FDI of $10 billion by 1997 but, even as late as 
2003, less than half of the target has been achieved. A pre-condition to FDI inflows is the 
creation and sustenance of a well-designed business environment. The new institutional 
economics literature with its emphasis on transaction costs have focused on the creation 
of an appropriate business environment or “investment climate” for the benefits of FDI56 
to be realized by a developing economy (Fields and Pfeffermann, 2003).  
 
 China is today the largest FDI destination. But the paradox is that its investment 
climate is not liberal in all directions. For example, China’s FDI policy is still relatively 
restricted in terms of FDI forms, foreign ownership shares, access to certain activities and 
performance requirements. China's laws and regulations unambiguously stipulate that 
foreign investors can choose from among three different forms to invest in China — 
contractual joint ventures; equity joint ventures; and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. A 
comprehensive study by the OECD titled China in the World Economy in 2002 has said 
that despite China's continued priority of luring FDI with advanced technology, there 
                                                          
55 “More room for Japanese investment in TN”, Business line, March 19, 2003. 
56 The need for growth in FDI inflows in the developing countries made by the MNCs has assumed 
significant importance in recent years as a potential source of economic growth and development (Sachs 
and Bajpai, 2000; De Mello and Luiz, 2000). It is also viewed as a source of private investment inflows that 
could be used as a mechanism for alleviating poverty (Fields and Pfeffermann, 2003). Apart from the 
traditional argument that FDI accelerates economic growth by raising the capital stock of recipient 
countries, there is also the recent hypothesis that views FDI inflows as a channel of technology transfer 
through technological diffusion (Markusen, 1995). Access to advanced technologies lead to knowledge 
spillovers in via imitation, competition, linkages and training (Kinoshita, 1998; Sjoholm, 1999; Saggi 
2000). 
 32
remain restrictions on the organizational forms of FDI entry57. There are 31 industries 
that do not allow the establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises, and 32 sectors 
in which the Chinese partners must hold majority share-holdings or a dominant 
position58.  
 
 In stark contrast to China, FDI in India is freely allowed in all sectors, including 
the services sector, save where the notified sectoral policy does not permit FDI beyond a 
ceiling. FDI for virtually all items/activities could be brought in through the automatic 
route under the power vested with the RBI and, for the remaining items/activities, 
through Government approvals. Again, as India is a founder member of the erstwhile and 
its successor WTO, its investment policies cannot be WTO-incompatible in terms of 
offering special and discriminatory treatment to foreign investors, as is the case with 
China, which became a WTO member only recently.  
 
Though the policy atmosphere in China for attracting FDI is more stringent 
relative to that in India, what is it that still makes China the darling of foreign investors, 
enabling it to gain FDI in unmatched volume year after year? Basic features that help 
attract FDI to China, besides a stable political structure, include lower commodity and 
utility prices, lower indirect taxes (14 percent as against 25-30 per cent in India), lower 
import duties on raw materials (13 percent as against 24 percent), higher labor 
productivity (1.6 to five times in different segments) and low capital investment 
requirements59.  
 
                                                          
57 China's current FDI policy is still relatively restricted in terms of FDI forms, foreign ownership shares, 
access to certain activities and performance requirements. China's laws and regulations unambiguously 
stipulate that foreign investors can choose from among three different forms to invest in China — 
contractual joint ventures; equity joint ventures; and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.  
China's industrial guidance on FDI has four categories — encouraged (agricultural new technologies, new 
or advanced technologies which can improve the quality of products, conserve energy and raw materials etc 
and so forth); permitted (FDI that is not under the categories of encouraged, restricted and prohibited); 
restricted; and prohibited. 
58 Industries where Chinese partners must have majority shares include coal-mining, design and 
manufacture of civil aero planes, construction and management of oil and gas delivery pipelines, as well as 
oil depots and oil wharves, printing and publishing, development and production of grain, cotton and 
oilseeds, domestic commerce, foreign trade, medical institutions and repairs, designing and manufacturing 
of special, high-performance ships, and ships at or above 35,000 tonnes.  
 




Efforts to improve investment climate in China have been augmented since 1998 
when it stepped up its efforts to encourage foreign investments in technology 
development and innovation and initiated a transformation from low to hi-tech industries. 
Several tax incentives have been offered to lure foreign investors. Equipment (and related 
technology), components and spares brought into China by the foreign invested research 
and development (R&D) centers are exempt from import duty. Besides, China still 
extensively uses fiscal and other fillips to encourage some specific types of investment — 
for instance, export-oriented and technologically advanced FDI — and to guide the flows 
into certain targeted regions and industries. 
 
Foreign enterprises transferring advanced technology to China are exempt from 
both business and income taxes. Foreign invested firms that increase their technology 
funding by more than 10 percent over the previous year are eligible to deduct 50 percent 
of the funds actually spent on technological development from their income-tax dues. 
Further, the technology, equipment and components imported by foreign investors for 
upgrading enterprises considered high-priority by the state are exempt from import duty. 
No such incentives are offered in India. On the contrary, the policy-makers impose 
obligations on foreign firms even for transfer of technology.  
 
Corporate tax rates are much higher in India (Table 24). This is a constraint that 
needs to be addressed by India in order to attract FDI. India lacks adequate incentives for 
new business promotion, which is in place in China. For example, China offers super-
national treatment to foreign firms through reduced or exempted taxes. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of harmonization of government policies in India.  
 
China attracts foreign investors not only by projecting its inherent strengths but 
also by creating a congenial economic atmosphere. The setting up of SEZs, where 
business is regulated by an independent authority, has been one of the major reasons for 
China's FDI successes. High priority to improve its power infrastructure, which was in 
shambles a decade ago, also helped. At present, China's power generating capacity is 
thrice India's, and its power tariff, only half as much. While roads and railways are more 
extensively built in India, the number of ports as well as sea freight is very small in India. 
Also, the spread of telecommunications (in terms of people per telephone and internet 
connections), which has become an indispensable part of globalization is remarkably 
limited in India (Table 24). 
 
Indisputably, China has overtaken India in almost all measures of economic 
growth and, in particular, as a recent CII-McKinsey report said, it has completely 
"outdone" India in manufacturing. As the study concedes, during the 1990s, China's 
manufacturing industrial sector grew at 12.3 percent. Per contra, India's grew at 5.1 
percent and, as a consequence, China's manufacturing sector is much larger than India's 
in terms of contribution to GDP per capita share ($1,322 vs $381, purchasing power 
parity (PPP) adjusted), share of GDP (35 percent vs 16 percent) and to employment (95 
million vs 45 million). China today has emerged as a major manufacturing base for the 
world in several products and has captured a large share of world trade in different 
products. It accounts for 29 percent of world trade in bicycles, 28 percent in toys, 25 
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percent in footwear and 20 percent in ready-made garments. In contrast, India's share of 
world trade is 2.2 per cent in bicycles, 0.2 percent in toys; 1.7 percent in footwear and 3.8 
percent in garments.  
 
The inescapable impression one gets about China is that its growth was fuelled 
not only by investment (both domestic due to high savings and FDI in directed areas and 
sectors by the State) but also by a phenomenal growth in labor productivity, a due stress 
on exports, robust domestic demand fed by low prices and with quality consciousness 
being the byword of companies. The McKinsey study states that China's manufacturing 
sector productivity is 1.6 times that of India and, in some sectors, as much as five times.  
 
Global integration means development of borderless production to cater to the 
needs of both the domestic and export markets. In its decade of liberalization, India has 
failed to provide a competitive manufacturing base to MNCs -- neither for their export 
efforts nor to meet the needs of the large middle-class market. Attention has been paid 
largely to the development of the services sector, software in particular. Foreign 
enterprises have, therefore, hardly made any effort to use India as their production base 
for exporting to other countries. India shows the advantages of a vast labor force with a 
skilled engineering and scientific community.  It also shows, however, deficiency in both 
the hard infrastructure, such as roads, ports, and power, as well as the soft infrastructure 
of public administration, labor market practices, and financial market depth. From the 
FDI point of view, an option worth considering would be to open up its service sector 
more boldly, even by throwing open its retail sector to FDI. 
  
The CII-McKinsey study, supported by the DIPP, notes that subsidies, marginal 
pricing and poor cost accounting drive lower domestic prices in China. But it hastens to 
note that lower domestic prices are based on sustainable economic factors. The factors for 
lower prices include lower indirect taxes, lower import duties, higher labor productivity, 
lower capital costs and lower margins. Citing a case, the report said the Chinese price for 
a three-blade, 48-inch ceiling fan is 32 percent lower than the Indian price. Lower 
indirect taxes in China account for almost half (14.5 percent of the Indian price) of the 
total price difference. Higher labor productivity further decreases prices by 5 percent, 
while lower raw material prices in China account for another 4 percent and lower capital 
costs for 2.5 percent of the Indian retail price. The remainder of the price difference of 
close to seven percent of the retail price is the result of such other factors as margins, 
capital productivity and difference in specifications between the Indian and the Chinese 
product, e.g. the use of steel rather than aluminum blades in Chinese fans.  
 
The study found the average incidence of import duties in China is 17 percent, 
and the trade-weighted average about 13 percent — almost half of India's trade-weighted 
level of 24 percent. Import duties on several key raw materials, such as plastics and 
aluminum, are much higher in India than in China. Higher import duties on raw materials 
result in higher prices of inputs, as most domestic players resort to import parity pricing. 
China has a flat 17 percent VAT rate (about 14 percent of the retail price), while India's 
indirect taxes range from 25 percent to 30 percent of the retail price for most 
manufactured products.  
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In view of the inherent cost and factor advantages that China enjoys to an 
exceptional degree, it is small wonder that, of the total FDI of $38 billion China received 
in 2000, $27 billion went to the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, India received 
only $2.4 billion in FDI, of which the manufacturing sector received a little less than $2 
billion. FDI has also played a key role in boosting Chinese exports, and foreign-invested 
companies accounted for almost 50 percent of China's exports in 2000.  
 
It is widely claimed that China's competitiveness is because of low wages. This is 
true when compared to those in Japan or the US — where it is 25 times more. But vis-à-
vis India, the wages are not that low — at $1,000 per annum on an average, it is only 
slightly lower than that in India. But with much higher labor productivity, China enjoys 
the low-wage windfall. While China and other Asian countries were going the whole hog 
to attract FDI, India seemed to be in no hurry to remove the impediments. For instance, 
over a decade back, more than 800 items were reserved for the small-scale sector, 
allowing only 24 percent FDI. Paradoxically though, the small-scale sector continues to 
be the platform, contributing to over 60 percent of India's exports. In China, foreign-
funded firms contribute nearly 47 percent of the nation's exports.  
 
Since 1991, India's FDI policy has merely involved tinkering with foreign equity 
holding in the manufacturing sector and negating the changes in the global pattern of FDI 
flow. In the latter half of the 1990s, over 80 percent of global FDI flows were related to 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), with little going to greenfield investments. In India, 
from 1999 to 2001 (up to November), acquisition of equity accounted for a mere 12 
percent of the FDI. Privatization delays and restrictive rules have choked M&A activity.  
 
 Several factors contributed to China's number one position in attracting FDI, 
including its market size, continued economic growth, stable political situation, sound 
investment environment, WTO membership, etc. A survey undertaken by CII in June 
2003 of some leading Indian companies (the sectors surveyed include stainless steel, 
information technology, banking, pharmaceuticals and consumer goods) in China to 
understand the growing relationship between industry in India and China. The good side 
of doing business in China, according to all sectors surveyed is that the Chinese 
government welcomes FDI and does not seek too much documentation for companies 
setting up ventures in China. Next, is the high level of decentralization between the 
provinces and the center in terms of attracting FDI. Infrastructure and communication 
facilities in China are as good as in any developed country. Most provinces do not need 
any central clearance when the FDI amount is not very high. Also, licenses for setting up 
shop or even trade come fast. Most companies get their approvals in less than six months. 
Over 60 percent of the companies get the work done in under six months while the 
remaining get in under one year60.  
                                                          
60 However, the flip side of for doing business with China include problems of language, lack of clarity 
regarding certain domestic regulations, complexity in legal machinery for the foreigner to comprehend and 





Thus, it is time that India should learn from China and improve its economic 
environment for attracting higher volume of investment flows on an enduring basis for 
long-term development by launching its second-generation of reform without any further 
loss of time. Accordingly, a more attractive package to lure MNCs needs to be put in 
place. The Indian government through its 'single window system' relating to foreign 
investments already aims to cut down bureaucratic hurdles. The gradual relaxation of 
rules has definitely encouraged more inflow of FDI. Coca Cola was able to get 
permission for a 100 percent wholly owned subsidiary in a week and Motorola received 
clearance in flat 2 days. Other Companies included Daimler-Benz, Procter & Gamble and 
Whirlpool. India has an edge over China vis-à-vis managerial skills, a large English-
speaking population, and highly educated workforce, especially in critically short supply 
areas- medicine, engineering and software, low wages /salaries, which are often 10-30 
percent of similar type of jobs in the west and a well-established legal system. 
Nevertheless, providing competitive fiscal incentives, opening up of more sectors to FDI, 
promoting SEZs for expanding export-oriented FDI and improving physical, and 
financial infrastructure are imperative in order for India to begin attracting large sums of 




FDI Inflows to Developing Countries by Host Region, 1992-2001 
                                                                                                                           (US $million) 








India 233 574 973 2144 2426 3619 2633 2168 2319 3403 18292  


























21.54 37.94 35.35 33.98 30.95 23.16 23.32 17.91 17.14 22.87  25.48 
Source: World Investment Report, United Nations, various issues. 
 







FDI inflows and GDP figures in India and China, selected years 
 1997 2000 2001 
India – FDI ($ billion) 3.6 2.3 3.4 
India – GDP (current $ billion) 409.7  457.0  477.6  
India – FDI/GDP (%) 0.88 0.51 0.71 
China – FDI ($ billion)  44.2 40.8 46.9 
China – GDP (current $ billion) 898.2 1100.0 1200.0 
China – FDI/GDP (%) 4.9 3.7 3.9 
Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002, World Bank 
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Table 3 
Countrywise FDI (and other) Actually Used in China, 1992-2002 
                                                                       (US $million) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total FDI (& other) 11291.62 27770.87 33945.84 37805.69 421351.60 
Hong Kong 7706.12 17444.93 19822.68 20185.11 201851.60 
Macao 202.82 587.56 509.44 439.82 606.28 
Singapore 125.93 491.80 1179.61 1860.61 2247.16 
Taiwan 1053.35 3139.13 3391.34 3165.16 3482.02 
Total 9088.22 21663.46 24903.07 25650.70 208187.06 
FDI by the MNCs  2203.40 6107.41 9042.77 17620.58 213164.54 
% of total FDI (& other) 
(including Singapore) 
80.49 78.00 74.35 67.85 49.41 
% to total FDI (& other) 
(excluding Singapore) 
79.37 76.24 69.89 62.93 48.87 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
Note: Chinese FDI data till 1996 comprised ‘other’ investment elements as well. These ‘other’ elements 
include value of equipment supplied by foreign businesses in transactions of compensation trade, 
processing and assembly and value of equipment supplied in financial leasing transactions. 
 
FDI by the MNCs includes the FDI inflows in China from US, UK, major European countries and Japan 
but excludes FDI inflows from Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore and Taiwan.  
 
Table 3 (contd.) 
Countrywise FDI Actually Used in China, 1992-2002  
                                                                    (US $million) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total FDI 45257.04 45462.75 40318.71 40714.81 46877.59 
Hong Kong 20632.00 18508.36 16363.05 15499.98 16717.30 
Macao 394.55 421.57 308.64 347.28 321.12 
Singapore 2606.96 3403.97 2642.49 2172.20 2143.55 
Taiwan 3289.39 2915.21 2598.70 2296.58 2979.94 
Total 26922.90 25249.11 21912.88 20316.04 22161.91 
FDI by the MNCs 18334.14 20213.64 18405.83 20398.77 24715.68 
% of total FDI (including 
Singapore) 
59.49 55.54 54.35 49.90 47.28 
% to total FDI (excluding 
Singapore) 
53.73 48.05 47.80 44.56 42.70 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
Note: Chinese FDI data till 1996 comprised ‘other’ investment elements as well. These ‘other’ elements 
include value of equipment supplied by foreign businesses in transactions of compensation trade, 
processing and assembly and value of equipment supplied in financial leasing transactions. 
 
FDI by the MNCs includes the FDI inflows in China from US, UK, major European countries and Japan 





Foreign Investment Inflows in India (1991-92 – 2000-01) 



























130 320 590 1310 2140 2820 3560 1660 2160 2340 1703 
a. RBI auto-
matic route 
 40 90 170 170 140 200 180 1410 1460 428.89 
b. SIA/ 
FIPB route 




    10 130 360 400 490 360 291.67 
d. NRI  60 60 220 440 710 630 250 60 90 70 259 
d/A (%) 46.15 18.75 37.29 33.59 33.18 22.34 7.02 3.61 4.17 2.99 13.81 
a+b+c 70 260 370 870 1430 2190 3310 1600 2070 2270 1444 
(a+b+c)/A 
(%) 
53.85 81.25 62.71 66.41 66.82 77.66 92.98 96.39 95.83 97.01 77.56 
Source: Constructed from Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance, various issues and 
RBI Annual Report, various issues. 
Note: ‘P’ indicates ‘provisional’ data 
          The average for the first four rows have been computed using arithmetic mean and that of the fifth 











Alcatel Aiwa 3M ABN Amro ABB 
Alstom Akai Avon Alliance Capital Caltex 
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Bell Canada Casio Coca-Cola ANZ Cummins 
Bechtel Electrolux Colgate Bank of America Daewoo 
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Cogentrix Gillette Hoechst Citicorp Du Pont 
Deutsche Telecom Hoover ICI Deutsche Bank Fiat 
Enron LG IDV Dresdner Bank Ford 
Fujitsu Levi Strauss Johnson & Johnson HSBC General Motors 
General Electric Matsushita Kellog ING Barings Hewlett Packard 
Hutchison Nokia Nestle Jardine Fleming Honda 
Itochu Philips Novartis KPMG Hyundai 
Mission Energy Samsung PepsiCo McKinsey & Co. IBM 
Mitsubishi Sansui Procter & Gamble Merrill Lynch Microsoft 
Motorola Sanyo Revlon Morgan Stanley Mobil 
Nynex Sony Reckitt & Colman Standard Chartered Oracle 
Shell Timex Sara Lee UBS Siemens 
Sumitomo Whirlpool Seagram  Suzuki 
Telstra Xerox Smithkline 
Beecham 
 Toyota 
Total  Unilever  Volvo 
US West     
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Table 6 
Countrywise FDI (and other) Actually Used in China, 1992-2001 
(US $million) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total FDI (& other) 11291.62 27770.87 33945.84 37805.69 421351.60 
Hong Kong 7706.12 17444.93 19822.68 20185.11 201851.60 
Macao 202.82 587.56 509.44 439.82 606.28 
Singapore 125.93 491.80 1179.61 1860.61 2247.16 
Taiwan 1053.35 3139.13 3391.34 3165.16 3482.02 
Total 9088.22 21663.46 24903.07 25650.70 208187.06 
% of total FDI (& other)  80.49 78.00 74.35 67.85 49.41 
Japan 748.27 1361.37 2086.16 3212.47 3692.14 
Korea, Republic  120.25 381.49 726.12 1047.10 1504.16 
Mauritius 0.11 0.19 1.19 1.0010 0.22 
Virgin Islands 4.00 13.92 128.27 303.76 537.61 
UK 38.50 220.51 688.84 915.20 1301.93 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 
91.28 62.48 264.12 390.53 518.87 
France 46.92 141.51 193.40 287.02 424.65 
Italy 26.66 99.89 206.16 270.20 169.44 
Netherlands 28.41 84.00 111.05 114.11 125.17 
Sweden 10.01 22.91 24.18 24.04 56.69 
Switzerland 29.44 46.88 71.60 79.38 214.41 
US 519.44 2067.85 2490.80 3083.73 3444.17 
Australia 35.05 110.34 188.26 232.99 194.06 
Canada 59.07 136.88 216.05 257.04 337.97 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
Note: Chinese FDI data till 1996 comprised ‘other’ investment elements as well. These ‘other’ elements 
include value of equipment supplied by foreign businesses in transactions of compensation trade, 
processing and assembly and value of equipment supplied in financial leasing transactions. 
 
 
Table 6 (contd.) 
Countrywise FDI Actually Used in China, 1992-2001  
(US $million) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total FDI 45257.04 45462.75 40318.71 40714.81 46877.59 
Hong Kong 20632.00 18508.36 16363.05 15499.98 16717.30 
Macao 394.55 421.57 308.64 347.28 321.12 
Singapore 2606.41 3403.97 2642.49 2172.20 2143.55 
Taiwan 3289.39 2915.21 2598.70 2296.58 2979.94 
Total 26922.90 25249.11 21912.88 20316.04 22161.91 
% of total FDI 59.49 55.54 54.35 49.90 47.28 
Japan 4326.47 3400.36 2973.08 2915.85 4348.42 
Korea, Republic  2142.38 1803.20 1274.73 1489.61 2151.78 
Mauritius 45.86 100.50 170.25 264.79 305.63 
Virgin Islands 1717.17 4031.34 2658.96 3832.89 5042.34 
UK 1857.56 1174.86 1044.49 1164.05 1051.66 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 
992.63 736.73 1373.26 1041.49 1212.92 
France 474.65 714.89 884.29 853.16 532.46 
Italy 215.04 274.57 187.44 209.51 219.98 
Netherlands 413.80 718.82 541.68 789.48 776.11 
Sweden 42.84 133.42 155.80 159.24 84.39 
Switzerland 215.67 228.82 247.09 194.03 205.44 
US 3239.15 3898.44 4215.86 4383.89 4433.42 
Australia 313.74 271.97 263.31 308.88 335.60 
Canada 344.12 316.52 314.42 279.78 441.30 




Countrywise FDI Approval in India, 1992-2000 
(US $million) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Annual Re-dollar exchange 
rate ($1=Rs. …) 
30.649 31.366 31.399 33.45 35.5 
Total FDI  1268.41 2824.50 4518.36 9597.96 10182.20 
Hong Kong 18.62 28.04 52.48 121.72 143.07 
Macao      
Singapore 19.65 21.28 84.56 79.37 279.17 
Taiwan 5.87 3.19 3.25 1.16 21.93 
Japan 199.10 82.07 127.68 452.69 419.23 
Korea, Republic  12.86 9.35 34.03 93.93 907.30 
Mauritius 0 40.52 170.30 540.63 657.47 
Virgin Islands 0.17 1.47 1.16 1.95 10.55 
UK 38.39 198.54 413.76 515.95 429.46 
Federal Republic of Germany 28.15 56.09 181.33 400.45 433.21 
France 9.67 41.16 28.58 125.67 470.90 
Italy 29.16 37.41 124.51 137.62 39.12 
Netherlands 31.58 102.55 65.91 288.93 295.41 
Sweden 15.79 0.20 3.71 150.15 150.15 
Switzerland 225.05 136.07 15.38 92.52 45.00 
US 401.81 1103.70 1110.89 2108.93 1987.15 
Australia 25.33 9.42 123.71 449.69 235.05 
Canada 0.25 8.69 13.40 410.60 55.36 
Source: http://www.economywatch.com/database/foreigninvestment2.htm 
Note: Annual Re-dollar exchange rate is quoted from Economic Survey of India 2001-02, Government of 
India, p. S-76.  
The annual FDI inflow data to India from Macao is not available presumably because of the absence of FDI 
inflows. 
Table 7 (contd.) 
Countrywise FDI Approval in India, 1992-2000 
(US $million) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 * 
Annual Re-dollar exchange 
rate ($1=Rs. …) 
37.165 42.071 43.333 45.684 
Total FDI 14769.63 7324.17 6546.17 34.18 
Hong Kong 69.57 56.58 10.19 6.95 
Macao     
Singapore 86.04 204.87 177.08 15.41 
Taiwan 0.36 0.85 1.72 1.12 
Japan 512.94 304.92 296.04 37.36 
Korea, Republic  526.30 87.56 842.07 5.61 
Mauritius 2705.74 752.52 877.63 105.05 
Virgin Islands 4.93 2.33 6.67 0 
UK 1208.32 760.82 683.78 42.77 
Federal Republic of Germany 580.07 202.93 263.76 35.32 
France 191.96 122.07 334.30 3.66 
Italy 321.54 66.16 406.04 1.8 
Netherlands 234.24 117.96 145.90 14.76 
Sweden 29.33 51.21 63.22 16.35 
Switzerland 132.83 67.75 67.20 10.86 
US 2705.74 3225.46 821.99 165.38 
Australia 116.15 626.97 149.76 5.17 
Canada 103.39 75.03 8.50 18.47 
Source: http://www.economywatch.com/database/foreigninvestment2.htm 
Note: * upto 03/31/2000 
Note: Annual Re-dollar exchange rate is quoted from Economic Survey of India 2001-02, Government of 
India, p. S-76.  




Country-wise Average FDI Inflow in India and China, 1992-2000 
(US $million) 
 China Rank India Rank China: 
Times 
Larger 
Total FDI 78213.21  6340.62  12.33 
Total FDI from these countries 11664.52  4270.07  2.73 
Percent Country-wise FDI to 
total FDI  
14.91  67.34   
Japan 2746.24 2 270.23 5 10.16 
Korea, Republic  1165.45 5 279.89 4 4.16 
Mauritius 64.90 15 649.98 2 0.10 
Virgin Islands 1469.77 4 3.25 15 452.24 
UK 933.99 6 476.87 3 1.96 
Federal Republic of Germany 607.93 7 242.37 6 2.51 
France 446.72 8 147.55 8 3.03 
Italy 184.32 12 129.26 10 1.43 
Netherlands 325.17 9 144.14 9 2.26 
Sweden 69.90 14 53.35 14 1.31 
Switzerland 147.48 13 88.07 12 1.68 
US 3038.15 1 1514.56 1 2.01 
Australia 213.18 11 193.47 7 1.10 
Canada 251.32 10 77.08 13 3.26 





FDI Approval Trend in Major Asian Countries 
 
(US $ million) 
Country 2000 2001 2002 
China 62,379.0 69,194.0 48,010.0 
Malaysia 5223.2 4,975.6 2,948.5 
Thailand 2,813.0 3,941.0 NA 
Indonesia 15,423.0 15,043.0 9,744.1 
Singapore 4,198.8 3,688.8 3,932.4 
South Korea 15,697.0 11,870.0 NA 
Taiwan 7,608.0 5,129.0 NA 
India 8,613.8 5,972.2 2,320.8 
 






Sectoral Distribution of FDI in India 
 


























17 18 16 9 15 9 19 8 7 2 
2.Enginee-
ring 
25 8 15 18 35 20 21 21 14 8 
3.Domestic 
Appliances 









10 11 7 6 12 4 1 8 4 2 
6.Com-
puters 
3 2 1 4 3 5 5 6 16 12 
7.Pharma-
ceuticals 
1 12 1 4 2 1 1 3 3 2 
8.Others 25 19 19 24 14 22 13 35 30 13 
Manufac-
turing (1-8) 
98 85 78 74 88 84 73 92 86 61 
Finance 1 10 11 19 11 5 9 1 2 1 
Services 1 5 11 7 1 11 18 7 12 38 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
P: Provisional 
Source: Computed on the basis of RBI Annual Reports, various issues. 
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Table 11  
FDI Approval and Inflows for the leading Sectors in India over August. 1991 to October. 2002 
 
 (US S million)  














Energy      
(i) Power 11.86 15.4    
(ii) Oil Refinery 9.06 12.0    











7.03 9.8 2.49 13.9 (1) 34.1 
Transportation 
Industry 




4.93 6.5 1.57 8.3 (5) 32.4 
Metallurgical 
Industries 
4.25 5.5 0.25 1.4 (9) 6.4 
Chemicals (excluding 
fertilizers) 
3.68 4.5 1.32 6.7 (6) 37.7 
Food Processing 
Industries 
2.71 3.3 0.79 4.0 (7) 30.8 
Hotel & Tourism 1.38 1.7 0.14 0.8 (10) 11.1 
Textiles 1.01 1.2 0.29 1.5 (8) 30.6 
 
Source: SIA (FDI Data Cell), Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce 





Sectors attracting highest FDI approvals with FDI inflows in India over August. 1991 to October. 
2002 
 
 (US S million) 
Sector No. of Technical Collaborations 
(TC) Approved 
Percentage with Total TC 
Approved 
Electrical Equipment (including 
computer software & electronics) 
1174 16.4 
Industrial Machinery 832 11.6 
Chemicals (excluding fertilizers) 813 11.3 
Transportation Industry 604 8.4 
Metallurgical Industries 355 4.9 







Sectoral Distribution of Actually Used FDI in China 
 
(Percentage of total) 
Sector/ 
Industry 
1999 (Rank) 2000 (Rank) 2001 (Rank) 
Agriculture 2 2 2 
Mining & Quarrying 1 1 2 
Manufacturing 56 (1) 63 (1) 66 (1) 
Electric Power, Gas, Water Production & 
Supply 
9 (2) 6 (3) 5 (4) 
Construction 2 2 2 
Geological Prospecting & Water Conservancy 0 0 0 
Transport, Storage, Post & Telecom Services 4 (4) 3 2 
Wholesale & Retail Trade & Catering Services 2 2 3 (5) 
Banking & Insurance 0 0 0 
Real Estate Management 3 (5) 11 (2) 11 (2) 
Social Services 6 (3) 5 (4) 6 (3) 
Healthcare, Sports & Social Welfare 0 0 0 
Education, Culture & Arts, Radio, Film & 
Television  
0 0 0 
Scientific Research & Polytechnical Services 0 0 0 
Other Sectors 2 4 (5) 2 
National Total 100 100 100 
Note: Figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number. 0 percentage implies percentages less than 
0.5. When the individual percentages fall short of the national total, it signifies that this discrepancy is the 
rounding-up error attributable to the rounding up at each sectoral level.  













Malaysia 50 50 
Thailand 40 60 
Phillipines 35 65 
Indonesia 25 75 
South Korea 15 85 
China 20 80 






Ranking of Emerging Economies according to the Potential of the Growth of Retail Sector 
Country Rank Score 
(%) 
China 1 72 
Slovak Republic 2 68 
Hungary 2 68 
Russia 2 68 
Morocco 3 67 
Vietnam 4 63 
India 4 63 





Value of Export Goods of Foreign Funded Enterprises in China from 1998 through 2001 
 
($100 million) 










a as percent of b
1998 809.6189 1837.09 44.07 
1999 886.2766 1949.31 45.47 
2000 1194.4121 2492.03 47.93 
2001 1332.3506 2661.55 50.06 
 




Value of Exports of Commodities in China over 1991 to 2001 (Customs Statistics) 
($100 million) 
Year Primary Goods Manufactured Goods Total Value of Exports Manufactured Exports 
as a Percent of Total 
exports 
1991 161.45 556.98 718.43 77.53 
1992 170.04 679.36 849.40 79.98 
1993 166.66 750.78 917.44 81.83 
1994 197.08 1012.98 1210.06 83.71 
1995 214.85 1272.95 1487.80 85.56 
1996 219.25 1291.23 1510.48 85.49 
1997 239.53 1588.39 1827.92 86.90 
1998 204.89 1632.20 1837.09 88.85 
1999 199.41 1749.90 1949.31 89.77 
2000 254.60 2237.43 2492.03 89.78 
2001 263.53 2398.02 2661.55 90.10 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
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Table 18 

























1991 556.98 38.18 144.56 71.49 166.20 136.55 
1992 679.36 43.48 161.35 132.19 342.34  
1993 750.78 46.23 163.92 152.82 387.81  
1994 1012.98 62.36 232.18 218.95 499.37 0.12 
1995 1272.95 90.94 322.40 314.07 545.48 0.06 
1996 1291.23 88.77 284.98 353.12 564.24 0.12 
1997 1588.39 102.27 344.32 437.09 704.67 0.04 
1998 1632.20 103.21 324.77 502.17 702.00 0.05 
1999 1749.90 103.73 332.62 588.36 725.10 0.09 
2000 2237.43 120.98 425.46 826.00 862.78 2.21 
2001 2398.02 133.54 438.23 949.18 871.23 5.84 
1991-
2001 
15170.22 933.69 3174.79 4545.44 6371.22 145.08 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 49
Table 19 
Exports of India over 1991-92 to 2001-02 
     ($ million) 
Commodity 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-20 2000-01 20001-02 
I. Primary 
Products 
4132.2 3873.5 4915.7 5214.4 7256.9 8035.1 7687.3 6927.9 6524.2 7126.2 7065.2 
II. Manufactured 
Goods 
13148.4 14038.8 16656.7 20404.4 23747.0 24613.4 26546.6 25791.5 29714.4 34335.2 33127.8 
1. Leather and 
Manufactures 
1268.8 1277.5 1299.5 1610.6 1752.2 1605.8 1656.7 1660.7 1590.2 1944.4 1905.5 
2. Chemicals and 
Allied Products 





628.8 529.3 640.7 800.1 1019 1223 1458.2 1487 1668.5 1917 2044.6 
b) Others 850.5 699.3 837.1 1155.4 1340 1467.3 1711.7 1419.2 1740.5 2117.2 1995.1 
3. Plastic and 
Linoleum Products 
112.1 149.4 335.9 478.3 585.4 539.4 514.3 471.7 603.8 915.2 970.7 
4. Rubber, Glass, 
Paints, Enamels 
and Products  
269.8 395.5 523.6 619.1 642 670.7 696.8 613.5 679.6 936.5 974 
5. Engineering 
Goods 
2253.1 2480.8 3038.1 3508 4391 4962.7 5336.2 4463.9 5152.1 6818.6 6873.4 
6. Readymade 
Garments 
2199.2 2393 2586.2 3281.9 3675.6 3753.3 3876.2 4364.9 4765.1 5568.9 4987.4 
7. Textile Yarn, 
Fabrics, Made-
ups, etc., 
1804.6 1900.9 2140.2 3044.6 3523 4056.8 4355.3 3724.7 4188.7 4888.5 4416.8 
a) Cotton Yarn, 
Fabrics, Made-
ups, etc., 
1299.3 1350.5 1537.1 2233.8 2576.6 3121.7 3264.3 2771.9 3089.6 3460.7 3031 
b) Natural Silk 
Yarn, Fabrics, 
Made-ups, etc., 
142 138.6 127.2 136.2 133.2 128.8 176.4 178.2 237.7 306.9 274.6 
c) Others 363.2 411.8 475.9 674.6 813.2 806.3 914.6 774.6 861.4 1120.9 1111.2 
8. Jute 
Manufactures 
158.5 122.6 124 150.6 185.7 155.4 186.8 138.2 125.7 151.2 127.9 
9. Coir and 
Manufactures 
28.5 31.2 41.4 55 62.9 61 68.6 75.2 46.1 48.3 61.6 
10. Handicrafts 3386.9 3783.1 4768.1 5328.2 6129.2 5664.7 6282 6971.7 8669.6 8492.4 8222.9 
a) Gems and 
Jewellery 
2738.2 3071.7 3995.8 4500.4 5274.8 4752.7 5345.5 5929.3 7502.3 7384 7305.7 
b) Carpets  
( Handmade excl. 
Silk ) 
407.4 434.8 453.8 441.5 420.4 436.3 410.6 409.3 498.6 446.9 369.3 
c) Works of Art  
( excl. Floor 
Coverings ) 
241.5 276.6 318.5 386.3 433.9 475.7 525.9 633.1 668.6 661.5 547.9 
11. Sports 
Goods    
31.5 35 44.5 65.8 73.7 78.1 80.8 73.2 67 64.6 68.2 
12. Others 156.1 241.1 277.4 306.8 367.4 375.2 322.9 327.4 417.6 472.3 479.7 
III. Petroleum 
Products 
414.7 476.2 397.8 416.9 453.7 481.8 352.8 89.4 38.9 1869.7 2085.9 
IV. Others 170.1 148.7 268.1 294.8 583.4 339.4 419.8 409.9 544.9 1229.2 1547.8 





Export Performance of the Functional SEZs in India over 2000 to 2003 
 







Kandla Gujarat 6.17 4 5.18 5 7.25 4 
SEEPZ Maharashtra 60.73 1 56.86 1 60.49 1 
Cochin Kerala 3.56 6 2.81 7 2.69 8 
Surat Gujarat 0.73 8 3.39 6 2.79 7 
Noida Uttar Pradesh 12.09 2 10.67 2 9.96 2 
Madras Tamil Nadu 8.08 3 8.30 4 8.18 3 
Visakhapatnam Andhra Pradesh 2.56 7 2.73 8 3.55 6 
Falta West Bengal 6.08 5 10.05 3 5.10 5 




Ranks of Indian States as Perceived by Foreign Investors, 2001 
 
State Ranking  
Maharashtra  1 
Karnataka  2 
Andhra Pradesh  3 
TamilNadu  4 
Gujarat  5 
Haryana  6 
MadhyaPradesh  7 
WestBengal  8 
Uttar Pradesh  9 
 














Tamil Nadu 3 
Karnataka 4 
Gujarat 5 
Andhra Pradesh 6 
Madhya Pradesh 7 
West Bengal 8 
Orissa 9 
Uttar Pradesh 10 
Haryana 11 
 






Export and FDI Performance of Chinese Provinces with SEZs over 1998 to 2001 
(Percentage of total) 
1998 1999 2000 2001  
Export FDI Export FDI Export FDI Export FDI 
Fujian 5.42  5.31 9.98 5.18 8.43 5.23 8.36 
Guangdong 41.14  39.85 28.91 36.88 27.71 35.85 27.71 
Hainan 0.42  0.38 1.20 0.32 1.06 0.30 1.00 
Source: Computed from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Note: Export data refer to the total value of Export by Location of China’s Foreign Trade Managing Units. 




Comparative Statistics of India and China (2000) 
 
NO DESCRIPTION CHINA INDIA 
1 Population (billion) 1.276 1.029 
2 Urban Population (%) 37 33 
3 GDP (Billion $) 1121 440 
4 Per capita income ($) 990 440 
5 Exports (billion $) 250 44.1 
6 Inflation (%) 1.3 4.0 
7 Savings (% of GDP) 39 22 
8 Labor Laws More flexible Less flexible 
9 Corporate Tax (%) 15 36.75 
10 Double Taxation No Yes 
11 Value Added Tax (VAT) Yes No 
12 Power Generation (billion KW) 1,166 417 
13 Electricity Tariff ($/100KW) 4.3 (Rs 1.97/unit) 7.53 (Rs 3.80/unit) 
14 Sea Freight (million tonnes) 922.37 (17 ports) 251.73 (12 ports) 
15 Roads (million km) 1.7 3.0 
16 Railways (thousand km) 68.0 81.5 
17 People per telephone 12 46 
18 Percent FDIs from non residents 65 10 
19 Forex Reserves (billion $) 312 67 
20 Internet Connections (millions) 35 3 
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